Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact upon Valuation of Minority Shares by Murdock, Charles W.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 65 | Issue 3 Article 2
6-1-1999
Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority
Shareholders and Its Impact upon Valuation of
Minority Shares
Charles W. Murdock
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles W. Murdock, Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 425 (1990).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol65/iss3/2
The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority
Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation
of Minority Shares
Charles W. Murdock*
I. Introduction
"There are 51 shares," said he, "that are worth $250,000.
There are 49 shares that are not worth a - -. "I
Such was the plight, we are told, of the minority shareholder. Since
the majority, through the board of directors, ruled the company, no one
would buy the minority's shares. The dilemma for the minority share-
holder in the closely-held corporation was that those in control could
reap the benefits of ownership through compensation and other with-
drawals not available to the minority; the minority would receive no re-
turn on his or her investment, nor could the shares be sold because no
prudent person would step into the shoes of the minority.
Just over thirty-five years ago, Carlos Israels, in his seminal article,
The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Dead-lock and Dissolution,2
suggested that close corporations should receive judicial treatment
analogous to that afforded partners in a partnership. The thrust of Pro-
fessor Israels' article was that, as a result of the liberalizing of legislative
and judicial attitudes with respect to close corporations, such as the ac-
ceptance of unanimous vote requirements, 3 draftsmen now had a greater
opportunity to protect the interests of minority shareholders through
charter provisions or contractual agreements.
While freeze-outs 4 remained a possibility, Professor Israels also saw
a trend in which, as a result of veto provisions inserted in corporate doc-
uments to protect minority interests, there would be more deadlocks or
stalemates. Stalemate, which he defined as the "consistent non-coopera-
* Professor of Law at Loyola University; former Dean of Loyola University Law School; former
Deputy Attorney General for the State of Illinois; J.D., Loyola University Law School, 1963.
1 Humphrys v. Winous Co., 165 Ohio St. 45, 50, 133 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1956).
2 Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Cm. L.
Rev. 778 (1952).
3 Id. at 780-81. For example, although New York struck down a shareholder agreement requir-
ing unanimity for director action, in Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829
(1945), the decision was overruled by the legislature three years later when § 9 was added to the
New York Stock Corporation Law. See In re Burkin, I N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 862, 165 N.Y.S.2d 898
(1956).
4 As used in this Article, a "freeze-out" is used to denote the situation in which a minority
shareholder retains his or her interest but is deprived either of employment or of dividends such that
he or she is unable to realize any return on the investment in the close corporation. On the other
hand, "squeeze-out" is used to denote the situation in which the interest of the minority shareholder
is involuntarily acquired by the corporation, for example, in a "cash-out" merger. Also, as used in
this Article, the phrase "minority shareholder" includes not only a less than 50% shareholder but
also a 50% shareholder who is excluded from participation in management.
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tion, with or without moral justification," 5 of one or more individuals,
could have the effect of seriously harming the enterprise and the interest
of the majority. Thus, since dissolution could work to the advantage of
all concerned, Professor Israels advocated judicial liberality in dissolving
corporations at the instance of minority shareholders.
While dead-lock occasionally rears its head 6 and while minority
shareholders sometimes use their veto power to the detriment of the ma-
jority and the corporate enterprise, 7 the ensuing years have demon-
strated that it is still the minority shareholders who are most likely to be
disadvantaged in the corporate enterprise. Often, if not generally,
predispute planning is lacking 8 and the view of dissolution as a "drastic"
remedy generally works to the disadvantage of minority shareholders. 9
From a relational standpoint, people enter closely-held businesses in the
same manner as they enter marriage: optimistically and ill-prepared. Mi-
nority shareholders often fail to obtain counsel and protect themselves
through veto provisions or otherwise; accordingly, litigation subsequent
to Professor Israels' article has been predicated not so much upon dead-
lock but rather upon statutory provisions that enable a shareholder to
seek dissolution if the actions of those in control of the corporation are
"oppressive."10
Because corporate dissolution has been judicially viewed as a drastic
remedy, courts have struggled with the concept of oppression and the
conduct that is necessary to establish oppression. Jurisdictions have va-
ried in the breadth they were willing to attach to this concept" and have
sought to flesh out its meaning in a variety of restatements of the term.' 2
At least through the 1970s, predicting what manner of conduct would
give rise to a finding of oppression had been uncertain at best.
In the 1970s, the analogy of a close corporation to a partnership led
to the development of a body of law that recognized that controlling
5 Israels, supra note 2, at 781.
6 See Ward v. Colcord, 110 Ill. App. 2d 68, 249 N.E.2d 137 (1969);Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach
Co., 219 Or. 560, 348 P.2d 9 (1959); infra note 118 and accompanying text. See generally Comment,
Deadlock and Dissolution in the Closed Corporation: Has the Sacred Cow Been Butchered?, 58 NEB. L. REv.
791, 814-24 (1979).
7 Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981).
8 See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
10 See infra text following note 195.
11 Compare Capitol Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Miss. 1980) (no oppression
was found "where the complaining party's reasonable expectations have been thwarted, but not
grossly so") with Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 220, 170 N.E.2d 131, 138
(1960) (oppression was found in a situation where the president "acted in an arbitrary and high-
handed manner"). See also infra notes 198-24 1 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 3d 294, 299, 405 N.E.2d 839, 843 (1980)
("overbearing and heavy-handed"); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 72, 473 N.E.2d 1173,
1179, 474 N.Y.S.2d 799, 805 (1984) ("[Clonduct that substantially defeats the 'reasonable expecta-
tions' held by minority shareholders in committing their capital to the particular enterprise");
Mardikos v. Arger, 116 Misc. 2d 1028, 1031, 457 N.Y.S.2d 371, 374 (Sup. Ct. 1982) ("conduct which
fair-minded people would find objectionable"); Scottish Co-Operative Ltd. v. Meyer, 3 All E.R. 66,
71, 86 (1958) ("burdensome, harsh, and wrongful" and "a lack of probity and fair dealing"); Elder v.
Elder & Watson, Ltd., 1952 Sess. Cas. 49, 55 (1951) ("a visible departure from the standards of fair
dealing").
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shareholders have a fiduciary duty to treat minority shareholders fairly.' 3
While this doctrine afforded minority shareholders some leverage
against "freeze-out" ploys14 by the majority, it did not necessarily 15 pro-
vide the minority shareholder with a way to recover his investment and
exit the corporation. As long as the minority shareholder was left within
the corporation, when the majority terminated the minority share-
holder's employment or refused to declare dividends or engaged in other
conduct disadvantageous to the minority, it was often uncertain whether
courts would apply the business judgment rule 16 or the majority's fiduci-
ary duty rule to the questioned transaction.
Through the late 1970s and into the 1980s, a substantial number of
states enacted statutes providing for alternative remedies to dissolution.
These statutes generally included a judicially supervised buy-out of the
minority by the corporation or the controlling shareholders.17 Injudicial
decisions in those states which have. enacted such statutory alternatives,
or in those jurisdictions where the courts themselves have recognized
their own inherent equity power to fashion alternatives, there is a trend
to liberalize the concept of oppression and to make relief more readily
available to minority shareholders.
That such a trend should exist is not surprising. In the past, courts
have hesitated to order dissolution because they have viewed it as a dras-
tic remedy. However, once the legislature or the courts recognize an al-
ternative which, since it keeps the enterprise in existence, is less drastic
than dissolution, it would follow that the conduct giving rise to relief
under this less drastic form need itself be less drastic. In other words, if
dissolution is a drastic remedy, then the conduct necessary to constitute
oppression and justify dissolution must be "drastic" or severely oppres-
sive; on the other hand, if alternative remedies are less drastic, then the
conduct necessary to give rise to the less drastic remedy need itself be
less drastic or less oppressive.
Alternative remedies generally fall into one of three categories: (1)
direct judicial action, generally by way of injunction, e.g., mandating the
declaration of dividends;18 (2) appointment of a provisional director or
13 See infra notes 62-108.
14 See supra note 4. See also infra note 77 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text (some states have adopted an "equal opportu-
nity" doctrine which gives the minority the right to be bought out if, but only if, the majority causes
some of its shares to be repurchased).
16 See infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 243-58 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., Patton v. Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 398, 279 S.W.2d 848, 857 (1955), in which the
Texas Supreme Court, in considering the lower courts' appointment of a receiver to liquidate a
profitable corporation, substituted a new decree that "will include a mandatory injunction requiring
the corporation and the petitioner as its dominant officer and stockholder to declare and pay at the
earliest practical date a reasonable dividend on the stock of the corporation." The court went on to
state:
This means that the amount of such dividend shall be substantial and shall take into consid-
eration, as a strong factor in favor of greater size or amount, the amount of accumulated
surplus of the corporation, the fact that the respondents have been wrongfully deprived of
their dividends since the beginning, the more or less liquid or 'current asset' character of
the large inventory of presumably salable merchandise, as well as such other matters as
have logical bearing.
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custodian;' 9 or (3) a judicially ordered buy-out of the minority at a fair
price. 20 The first two alternatives carry with them the potential drawback
that, if the problem is triggered by animosity among the shareholders,
there may be an endless parade back to court to seek additional relief,
should the animosity not be resolved.2 1 Therefore, in many instances,
the only permanent resolution to the problem would be to eliminate the
complaining minority interest by a repurchase of shares.
However, for a judicially mandated repurchase to be an effective
remedy for minority shareholders, the price must be "fair," and fairness
certainly is an illusive concept. As litigation has demonstrated, the ma-
jority and the minority have dramatically different views as to what con-
stitutes a fair price. 22 Often the alleged oppressive conduct itself impacts
on price: if the majority is taking excessive salaries to the exclusion of the
minority, the earnings of the corporation will be thereby reduced and
any valuation technique predicated upon earnings, such as capitalized
earnings or discounted cash flow, will be "unfair" unless earnings and
cash flow are adjusted to reflect the situation that would exist absent the
oppressive conduct.23
One of the major obstacles that minority shareholders have had to
confront in dealing with a judicial determination of fair value has been
the issue as to whether a discount should be employed in the valuation
process. 24 The thrust of this Article is to suggest not only that the exist-
ence of alternative remedies has "liberalized" the concept of what consti-
Id. See also § 825 (2)(c) of the Michigan Corporation Code, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 450.1825(2)(c) (West 1973 & Supp. 1988) which gives a circuit court the power to grant relief
other than dissolution when the acts of those in control are oppressive.
19 See In reJamison Steel Corp., 158 Cal. App. 2d 27, 322 P.2d 246 (1958); Giuricich v. Emtrol
Corp., 449 A.2d 232 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982); ARC Mfg. Co. v. Konrad, 321 Pa. Super. 72, 467 A.2d
1133 (1983). See also statutes in Alabama (ALA. CODE § 10-2A-309 (1987)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN.
§ 22-703 (1977 & Supp. 1988)), Hawaii (HAw. REV. STAT. § 415-96 (1985 & Supp. 1988)), Missis-
sippi (MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-14.32 (Supp. 1988)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-24-303
(1988)), and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-748 (1985)).
20 See infra notes 243-70.
21 See In re Fulton-Washington Corp., 3 Misc. 2d 277, 279, 151 N.Y.S.2d 417, 419 (1956). The
court reasoned that:
Whatever may have been the expectations of Burkin and Katz for corporate management
based upon harmonious unanimity of action, they were short-lived.... A bare enumeration
of the times one side or the other has resorted to our courts since 1953 would indicate the
litigiousness which has been the chief characteristic of these ventures, but it would not place
in true perspective the intransigent hostility of the warring principals which has produced
the paralysis from which these corporations suffer. The court is painfully aware of the fact that the
litigation of the principals thus far has consumed the time and efforts of not less than six
Justices sitting in Special Term, has involved one appeal to the Appellate Division of the
Second Department, four to the Appellate Division of the First Department, and one appeal
to the Court of Appeals.
Id. (emphasis added).
22 Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 397 Mass. 525, 492 N.E.2d 1112 (1986)
(controlling shareholder sought to cash out public at $15 per share; court awarded rescissory dam-
ages in the range of $80 per share); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass.
578, 583, 584 n.10, 328 N.E.2d 505, 510, 511 n.10 (1975) (the Rodds offered to have the Donahue's
stock bought out by the corporation at between $40 and $200 per share but bought out the elder
Rodd out at $800 per share); Taines v. Gene Barry One Hour Photo Process, Inc., 123 Misc. 2d 529,
474 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1983) (plaintiff's expert valued company at $20.7 million while defendant's ex-
pert testified the value was $71,000; court considered the testimony of the two experts "absurd").
23 See iq/ra text following note 334.
24 See imfra notes 349-88 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 65:425
REMEDIES FOR AND VALUATION OF MINORITY SHARES
tutes oppressive conduct, but also that the existence of buy-out relief,
coupled with the recognition that those in control owe fiduciary duties to
the minority, has dramatically changed the bargaining position of the mi-
nority shareholder. In this changed environment, the process of dis-
counting minority shares-a major impediment to the minority
shareholder receiving a fair price-is no longer justified.
II. The Basic Problem-Locked-In and Frozen-Out-And Judicial
Recognition of the Fiduciary Duty/Partnership Analogy
A. The Business Judgment Rule
Deeply imbedded in corporate law is the business judgment rule
which is a "judicial creation that presumes propriety, under certain cir-
cumstances, in a board's decision." 25 Early cases reposed almost unfet-
tered discretion in the board of directors. The court, in an early New
York case, stated:
[The acts of the directors] in good faith and the exercise of an honest
judgment, are valid, and conclude the corporation and the stockhold-
ers. Questions of policy of management, expediency of contracts or
action, adequacy of consideration, lawful appropriation of corporate
funds to advance corporate interests, are left solely to their honest and
unselfish decision, for their powers therein are without limitation and
free from restraint, and the exercise of them for the common and gen-
eral interests of the corporation may not be questioned, although the
results show that what they did was unwise or inexpedient. 2 6
Similarly, in a frequently cited 1892 decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court observed:
It is, however, fundamental in the law of corporations that the majority
of its stockholders shall control the policy of the corporation, and reg-
ulate and govern the lawful exercise of its franchise and business.
Every one purchasing or subscribing for stock in a corporation im-
pliedly agrees that he will be bound by the acts and proceedings done
or sanctioned by a majority of the shareholders, or by the agents of the
corporation [directors] duly chosen by such majority, within the scope
of the powers conferred by the charter. And courts of equity will not
undertake to control the policy or business methods of a corporation,
although it may be seen that a wiser policy might be adopted and that
the business would be more successful if other methods were
pursued. 27
Judicial deference to decisions of the board of directors involving
operational matters, when untainted by self-interest, is essential if busi-
ness is to be conducted efficiently and profitably. The business of busi-
ness is almost by definition the taking of risks-how much to buy? when?
25 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981). See Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488
A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (directors must act "in an informed and deliberate manner"). There must
be a rational basis for the decision and the decision must not be tainted by self-interest. PRINCIPLES
OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.1(c) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985).
26 Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 207 N.Y. 113, 124, 100 N.E. 721, 723-24 (1912).
27 Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197, 207-08, 32 N.E. 420, 423 (1892) (citations
omitted).
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
to whom to sell? at what price? and much more. Directors are not guar-
antors of the success of a corporation. 28 Nor should they need con-
stantly to look back over their shoulders, fearing their actions, taken in
the pressure of the moment, will be judged with the luxury of hindsight.
Directors are guardians of the corporate purse. Thus, decisions as
to whom to hire, whom to fire, how much to pay, whether or not to de-
clare a dividend, and whether to repurchase shares are within the prov-
ince of board discretion.
Yet, this is the stuff out of which the dilemma of the minority share-
holder is fashioned. 2 9 The minority shareholder by definition has funds
invested in the corporation. Often the shareholder also has invested
time and energy and has forsaken other opportunities to participate in
the corporate enterprise. 30 It is fundamental that a person makes such
an investment in order to generate a return. In the sphere of publicly
held corporations, directors today are under a duty to maximize share-
holder value.3 1
But how can value be realized, let alone maximized, for the minority
shareholder in a closely-held corporation. By judicial definition, a
closely-held corporation is one in which there is not a ready market for
its shares. 3 2 In the past, dividends generally were not declared in close
corporations.3 3 The practice-or nonpractice, depending upon your
perspective-was at least in part tax driven: earnings were either taken
out in the form of compensation, which was tax deductible whereas divi-
dends were not,3 4 or were retained to build value within the corporation
so that, when it was later sold, the earnings were in effect taxed at the
28 The riskiness of decision making was recognized by the court in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880,
886 (2d Cir. 1982). The court referenced an example by Professor Klein illustrating that riskier
ventures may be more profitable. W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 147-49 (1980).
29 In Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 NJ. Super. 141, 154, 400 A.2d 554, 561
(1979), the court stated:
Traditional principles of corporate law, such as the business'judgment rule, have failed to
curb this abuse [freeze-outs of the minority by those in control]. Consequently, actions of
close corporations [rather, actions by those in control] that conform with these [traditional]
principles cannot be immune from scrutiny.
For a thorough analysis of the application of the business judgment rule in the closely held corpora-
tion, see Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 456 (1985).
30 See In re Mordka v. Mordka Enters., Inc., 143 Ariz. 298, 693 P.2d 953 (1984) (plaintiff moved
his family from New Zealand and was fired by his brothers four months later); Harris v. Mardan
Business Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiff left longstanding employment
with 3M to join new venture); In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1980) (petitioner
severed a 25-year employment relationship and moved family from Florida to New York).
31 Cf. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (in
takeover situation in which it was dear corporation would be sold, directors' role was to act as "auc-
tioneers charged with getting the kest price for the shareholders").
32 Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (1964); Donahue v. Rodd Elec-
trotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975); Estate of
Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 34, 36, 482 N.E.2d 975, 978 (1984).
33 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.07 (3d ed. 1986).
34 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1989). See, e.g., Mann-Paller Found. v. Econometric Research, Inc., 644 F.
Supp. 92, 96 (D.D.C. 1986), where the court, in analyzing the plaintiff's action for dividends in
Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1974), stated that "[t]he controversy [in Wilder-
man] centered around the amount of compensation defendant had caused to be paid to himself.
The compensation originated in a policy designed to avoid corporate taxation by paying out net
corporate profits in the form of executive compensation to avoid double taxation."
[Vol. 65:425
REMEDIES FOR AND VALUATION OF MINORITY SHARES
lower capital gains rate.35 As a result, minority shareholders were often
left with employment by the corporation as the only means to realize a
return on their investment.
If the employment of a shareholder were terminated, a classic case of
being "frozen-out," yet "locked-in," would exist. 36 The shareholder
would be frozen-out of any participation in the earnings of the corpora-
tion since no dividends would be paid and no compensation would be
earned. 37 The shareholder would be locked-in since his capital invest-
ment would be held by the corporation with the shareholder having
neither a right to withdraw38 nor a ready market for sale of his shares.3 9
What the minority shareholder wants-a job, dividends, repurchase
of his shares, or possibly liquidation of the corporation-can be rejected
by those in control and ostensibly justified by resort to the business judg-
ment rule. This dilemma requires the development of an effective rem-
edy for minority shareholders, which must provide recourse in situations
in which the minority shareholders are treated unfairly by those in con-
trol, while at the same time not undercutting the application of the busi-
ness judgment rule in appropriate situations.
B. The Business Judgment Rule v. Duty of Loyalty
The common law traditionally has recognized that there are situa-
tions in which judicial deference to director decision-making will not be
recognized. This is reflected in the duty of care/duty of loyalty dichot-
omy. One of the time-honored duties of an agent,40 which has been car-
ried over to directors,4 ' is the duty to exercise due care in conducting the
affairs of the principal. This creates a quandary: How can courts defer to
the judgment of the board of directors and yet oversee the directors'
duty of care in exercising the responsibilities of their office.42 Courts43
and commentators44 have resolved this dilemma by viewing the duty of
care as a "process" duty rather than a qualitative duty. If directors follow
proper "process," there need be only a rational basis for their deci-
35 I.R.C. § 1201(a) (1986) (amended 1987); I.R.C. §§ 1221-23 (1986).
36 As the court, in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 849, 353 N.E.2d
657, 662 (1976) stated:
This 'freeze-out' technique has been successful because courts fairly consistently have been
disinclined to interfere in those facets of internal corporate operations, such as the selection
and retention or dismissal of officers, directors and employees, which essentially involve
management decisions subject to the principle of majority control.
37 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 588-89, 328 N.E.2d
505, 513 (1975).
38 Cf UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(2), 6 U.L.A. 376 (1969) (in a partnership, a partner has an
absolute right to "get out," even if "getting out" violates the partnership agreement).
39 [W]hen... 'freeze-outs' are attempted by the majority stockholders, the minority stock-
holders, cut off from all corporation-related revenues ... cannot easily reclaim [their] capi-
tal ... [a] market is not available [and they] ... can never 'authorize'... dissolution by
[their] own vote.... Thus .... the minority .... may be trapped.
Donahue, 367 Mass. at 590-92, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15.
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 377-98 (1957).
41 H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 234 (3d ed. 1983).
42 Murdock, Careless Directors: A New Public Policy for the State of Illinois, 77 ILL. BJ. 42, 43 (1988).
43 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).
44 See, e.g., A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
43-51 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985).
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
sions. 45 Rationality, not reasonableness, becomes the norm. As a result,
the number of cases in which directors of nonfinancial institutions were
held liable for simple negligence, uncomplicated by fraud or self-dealing,
was almost infinitesimal. In the decades preceding the 1970s, there ap-
parently were only four such cases.4 6 Clearly, the presumption in favor
of the director in duty of care cases is extremely difficult to surmount.4 7
On the other hand, cases involving the duty of loyalty are legion.48
Where a conflict of interest or usurpation of a corporate opportunity is
alleged, courts have little reticence about inquiring into the underlying
facts and, if the allegations are substantiated, setting aside the transac-
tion or affording other relief.4 9 In the duty of loyalty area, the courts are
not dealing with untainted decision-making by directors where the sole
issue is what is best for the corporation; rather, in this area, director
judgment is clouded by considerations as to what is best for the director.
The easiest duty of loyalty case is the direct self-dealing situation in
which the director engages in a transaction with the corporation. When
the subject matter is property, such as where the director buys stock50
from, or sells51 or rents52 real estate to, the corporation, holding the di-
rector accountable presents little problem. 53  Compensation issues, in
which the corporation requires the services of the director and the only
45 Id. § 4.01 (c)(3).
46 Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and
Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099-1100 (1968). Subsequently, there are at least three cases recogniz-
ing director liability: Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858
(Del. 1985); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981). However, the Van
Gorkom decision raised a cry of protest from the corporate bar. See, e.g., Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van
Gorkom: The Business ofJudging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAw. 1187 (1986); Manning, Reflections and
Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw. 1 (1985). Accordingly, Delaware
adopted a new statute exculpating directors from breaches of the duty of care. See 65 Del. Laws 289
(1985) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988)). See also Veasey, Finkelstein &
Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insur-
ance, 42 Bus. LAw. 399 (1987).
47 For example, in Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 183, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (1968),
the plaintiff alleged that 19 of the 20 major league teams played night baseball, that the Chicago
Cubs lost money during the past four-year period, and that the Chicago White Sox outdrew the Cubs
during the week, when the Sox played night games, while their attendance was comparable on week-
ends. Even though the Cubs were a maverick and were losing money, the court stated that directors
need not "follow the lead of the other corporations in the field" and that their conduct did not
manifest "a clear ... dereliction of duty." Id.
48 A LEXIS search, States library, Omni file, of "conflict of interest w/25 director or officer w/25
corporat!" found 245 cases.
49 Currently, even in the takeover situation, courts have recognized the potential for director
self-interest in adopting defensive measures. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794
F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986), revd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). This has led to the adoption
in Delaware of an "intermediate" standard of review. See Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate
Standard for Defensive Tactics: Proportionality Review, 44 Bus. La.w. 247 (1989).
50 See, e.g., Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Ross Transp., Inc. v. Crothers, 185 Md.
573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946).
51 See, e.g., New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E. 102 (1926).
52 See, e.g., Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc., 105 I11. App. 3d 1118, 435 N.E.2d 712
(1982).
53 Even though determining liability may be straightforward, establishing value is always fraught
with difficulty.
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issue is amount,54 and control issues, in which the corporation takes ac-
tion to ward off a third party,5 5 are more difficult.
Duty of loyalty cases involve fiduciary duties to, the corporation,
however. The minority shareholder is only indirectly affected. 56 The
suit is derivative and recovery is generally by the corporation. 57 Never-
theless, the duty of loyalty doctrine can be an effective weapon for minor-
ity shareholders. It has been utilized to prevent the majority from
entrenching itself in control by purchasing stock at an inadequate
price. 58 It has also been somewhat effective in preventing those in con-
trol from depleting corporate assets and earnings through excessive
compensation. 59 It is also an essential tool in readjusting a balance sheet
and income statement for valuation purposes. 60
But since the duty runs directly to the corporation, it does not afford
relief for wrongful conduct aimed directly at the minority shareholder.
While courts have recognized a duty by directors and those in control to
treat all shareholders equally, the failure to declare a dividend not only is
ostensibly protected by the business judgment rule but also impacts all
shareholders equally, thus arguably implicating no self-dealing.6 ' How-
ever, if effective remedies are to be available to minority shareholders,
development of the law beyond the duty of loyalty must take place.
C. Shareholder Fiduciary Duty-The Partnership Analogy
1. Development of the Concept of Shareholder Fiduciary Duty
Courts have, over the years, recognized some sort of fiduciary duty
of majority or controlling shareholders toward minority shareholders. 62
Often shareholder and director action were intertwined. 6 Jones v. H.F.
Ahmanson & Co., 64 in 1969, appears to be the first "pure" shareholder
fiduciary duty case. It is a "pure" shareholder fiduciary case because all
actions of the defendant shareholders were taken by them in their capac-
54 See, e.g., Miller v. Magline, Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1977) ("test to be
applied was whether... compensation was reasonable, and ... 'reasonableness in this connection
must be an area or a broad spectrum of compensation' ").
55 See, e.g., Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
56 Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploration: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining
Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 12-13 n.30 (1977) ("The notion that the fiduciary obliga-
tions of management run only to the corporation provides the minority in close corporations virtu-
ally no protection against oppression and exploitation by the control group."). See 3 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 848 (rev. perm. ed. 1975). Cf Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass. 578, 589 n.14, 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 n.14 (1975).
57 But see Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Lynch v.
Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126 (Wyo. 1985).
58 Katzowitz v. Sidler, 24 N.Y.2d 512, 249 N.E.2d 359, 301 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1969). But see Hyman
v. Velsicol Corp., 342 Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951). See also supra note 50.
59 Bessette v. Bessette, 385 Mass. 806, 808, 434 N.E.2d 206, 208 (1982); Donahue v. Draper, 22
Mass. App. Ct. 30, 35, 491 N.E.2d 260, 263-64 (1986).
60 See infra notes 335-48 and accompanying text.
61 Cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Del. 1971) (In the context of declaring
a dividend, the court held that, since "Sinclair received nothing.., to the exclusion of [the] minority
... these dividends were not self-dealing." A similar argument could be made with respect to
nondeclaration of dividends.).
62 See H. Henn &J. Alexander, supra note 41, at 653.
63 Id. at 651; Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
64 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
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ity as shareholders of the operating company, not as directors. The con-
trolling shareholders in the operating company transferred their shares
to a holding company and took the holding company public. From their
perspective, all they did was transfer their shares, an action to which they
were entitled and which was wholly consistent with a fundamental char-
acteristic of the corporate form-the free transferability of shares. 65 Nev-
ertheless, the court held that the majority had used their control power
in the operating company to create indirectly 66 a market for their shares
in the operating company to the exclusion of the minority shareholders.
While disadvantageous actions toward the minority in a close corpo-
ration usually involve director action or an amalgam of director and
shareholder action, the finding of a fiduciary duty on the part of control-
ling shareholders in Ahmanson set the tone for judicial developments be-
ginning in the mid-1970s. The most significant case is Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 67 where the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, after analyzing the plight of the minority shareholder in
depth, held that "stockholders in the close corporation owe one another
substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise
that partners owe to one another." 68 The court, quoting Justice Car-
dozo, described this duty as follows: "Many forms of conduct permissi-
ble in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to
those bound by fiduciary ties.... Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." 69 The
court saw the standard applicable to controlling shareholders to be
'more exacting than the traditional good faith and inherent fairness
standard" that generally applies to corporate directors.70
In Donahue, the court was confronted with a close corporation that
initially had two shareholders holding two hundred shares and fifty
shares, respectively. The controlling shareholder transferred some
shares to his children and the corporation then redeemed forty-five of his
shares with the result that each child would have fifty-one shares and the
minority shareholder, fifty. The minority shareholder sought to have her
shares repurchased by the corporation as well.
The court adopted an "equal opportunity" 7' rule and required
either that the corporation repurchase the minority's shares at the same
price as that paid to the father or that the father repay to the corporation
the consideration he had received for his shares. In adopting this rule,
the court found two evils in the transaction by the majority which disad-
vantaged the minority. First, citing Ahmanson, the court found that those
65 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1)(vi), -2(e) (1987).
66 The majority had transferred their shares in the operating company to a holding company and
took the holding company public. The minority retained their shares in the operating company for
which there was no public market.
67 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). Shepard's indicates this case has been cited over 80
times.
68 Id. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (footnotes omitted).
69 Id. at 594, 328 N.E.2d at 516 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E.
545, 546 (1928)).
70 Id. at 595, 328 N.E.2d at 516.
71 Id. at 598-600, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19.
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in control had made a market for the father's shares but not the minor-
ity's. 72 They transformed the father's previously illiquid investment into
a liquid one, to the exclusion of the minority shareholder. Second, the
transaction provided personal access to corporate assets on a discrimina-
tory basis. In effect, the transaction was a preferential distribution of the
assets of the corporation. 73
The following year, the Massachusetts court followed, but refined,
its decision in Donahue. This time the court was confronted with what is
probably a more typical problem in the close corporation-termination
of the employment of a minority shareholder. In Wilkes v. Springside Nurs-
ing Hone, Inc. ,74 the plaintiff had been one of the four investors who had
organized a close corporation in 1951 to operate the Springside Nursing
Home. Each investor was a director and was assigned particular respon-
sibilities for which, beginning in 1952, each received the same compensa-
tion as the others. In 1959, one of the original four sold his shares to a
new investor who, in 1965, purchased the corporate property adjacent to
the nursing home. Wilkes successfully argued for a higher price than the
new investor had wanted to pay and this triggered a deterioration of their
relationship. The strained relationship spread to the other investors as
well and, in 1967, Wilkes indicated his desire to sell. Instead, at a direc-
tors' meeting, his salary was terminated and, at the annual shareholders
meeting, he was not elected a director 75 or an officer.
The court stated that it was immaterial whether Wilkes' claim was
viewed as arising under partnership law or corporate law involving close
corporations. 76 Under either approach, those in control would have
breached their fiduciary duty to him by frustrating his purposes in enter-
ing the venture and by denying-him an equal return on his investment.
The denial of employment to the minority at the hands of the majority
is especially pernicious in some instances. A guaranty of employment
with the corporation may have been one of the 'basic reason[s] why a
minority owner has invested capital in the firm.' The minority stock-
holder typically depends on his salary as the principal return on his
investment, since the 'earnings of a close corporation.., are distrib-
uted in major part in salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits.'
72 Id. at 598-99, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
73 Id. at 599, 328 N.E.2d at 519. The court stated that the purchase of the father's shares had
the following effect:
In exchange for his shares, he receives a percentage of the contributed capital and accumu-
lated profits of the enterprise. The funds he so receives are available for his personal use.
The other stockholders benefit from no such access to corporate property and cannot with-
draw their shares of the corporate profits and capital in this manner unless the controlling
group acquiesces.
Id.
74 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
75 There apparently was no cumulative voting, for otherwise Wilkes would have been able to
insure his election as a director. However, the majority of the board could have ousted him as an
officer and, from a return-on-investment standpoint, compensation as an officer is much more signif-
icant than compensation as a director.
76 370 Mass. at 848, 353 N.E.2d at 661.
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[B]arring him from corporate office . . . [also] severely restricts his
participation in the management of the enterprise ....
However, the Wilkes court did recognize that "[t]he majority, con-
cededly, have certain rights to what has been termed 'selfish ownership'
in the corporation which should be balanced against the concept of their
fiduciary obligation to the minority."7 8 Where the minority alleges a
breach of fiduciary duty, the majority is entitled to demonstrate a legiti-
mate business purpose for their actions. 79 But even if the majority can
advance an ostensible business purpose, the minority must have the op-
portunity to show that "the same legitimate [business] objective could
have been achieved through an alternative course of action less harmful
to the minority's interest."8 0
In Wilkes, there was no evidence demonstrating a legitimate business
purpose for terminating Wilkes. Accordingly, the court found that the
majority had breached its fiduciary duties to Wilkes and that Wilkes was
entitled to money damages for "the salary he would have received had he
remained an officer and director of Springside." 8'
This pair of Massachusetts cases is the leading exposition of the con-
trolling shareholder fiduciary duty. Both cases have been cited in several
other jurisdictions,8 2 though not necessarily followed,8 3 and have been
characterized as "pioneer[ing] in developing an effective cause of action
for minority shareholders who have been denied their fair share of bene-
fits in close corporations. ' 8 4
2. Limitations on the Fiduciary Duty Approach
From the standpoint of providing an effective remedy generally for
minority shareholders, subsequent cases have suggested three possible
problem areas with the Donahue/Wilkes approach. The first limitation is
that the corporation in question must be a close corporation; the second,
that the relationship between the shareholders must be that of partners;
and the third, that justification of the transaction under the business pur-
pose doctrine must be excluded.
Two Minnesota decisions illustrate the first two problem areas. In
Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 85 an action was brought by minority share-
77 Id. at 849-50, 353 N.E.2d at 662 (citations omitted). Thus, termination would "frustrate" his
purposes and "deny him an equal return." Id. at 850, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
78 Id. at 850-51, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
79 Id. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663 (regarding the "business purpose" doctrine, see the cases and
law review articles cited by the court). See also Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977),
where the doctrine was adopted by Delaware in squeeze-out mergers, and Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), where it was abandoned. The doctrine, however, appears alive and well in
New York and Massachusetts. See Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 395 Mass. 215, 479 N.E.2d 173 (1985);
Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 473 N.E.2d 19, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1984).
80 370 Mass. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
81 Id. at 854, 353 N.E.2d at 665.
82 As of this writing, Shephard's indicates that Donahue has been cited 89 times in 25 jurisdictions
and Wilkes has been cited 38 times in II jurisdictions.
83 See, e.g., Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 304 Md. 256, 498 A.2d 642 (1985) (declined to
hold selective purchase as per se breach of duty).
84 Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1986).
85 390 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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holders to require the corporation to repurchase their shares, represent-
ing about ten percent of the outstanding shares. The Lampert family
owned about seventy percent of the shares and another twenty percent
was held by ninety other shareholders. During the previous thirty years,
there had been eighty-five redemptions of shares, but in only two cases
did the redemptions exceed 1000 shares. Because the president's sister
had been using company funds to pay her bills, he decided to repurchase
her shares to stop her from "leaning on the company."8 6 Her 7,222
shares were purchased in 1980 for about $1.2 million. Shares were re-
purchased from other family members in 1981 for $386,063, and
$432,562. The plaintiffs were not aware of these repurchases until the
annual shareholders meeting in March 1981, and in May they asked the
corporation to repurchase their shares for approximately $2 million. In
September, the board suspended all redemptions to avoid a "run on the
bank." 87 Plaintiffs' request was the first to be denied by the corporation.
The trial court ordered redemption but the court of appeals re-
versed on three bases: (1) the Minnesota alternative remedy statute88 au-
thorized a judicially ordered buy-out only for closely held corporations,
defined as those with not more than thirty-five shareholders;8 9 (ii) the
Donahue "equal opportunity" duty for controlling shareholders was also
limited to closely held corporations; and, (iii) there was no breach of the
duty of care in repurchasing the shares of family members, apparently
because the plaintiffs had not argued that the family repurchases harmed
the corporation in any way.
The Lampert Lumber court clearly engaged in an unduly restrictive
reading of Donahue. While it is true that Donahue analogized a close cor-
poration to a partnership in the process of imposing a fiduciary obliga-
tion on those in control to treat the minority fairly, Donahue also
recognized that one of the characteristics of a closely held corporation is
the lack of a market for its shares. It is this lack of a market that enables
those in control to "freeze-out" the minority.90
Donahue should not be read as condoning freeze-outs in nonclosely
held corporations. Lampert Lumber involved what has been referred to as
a "quasi-public" corporation. 9' It might better be referred to as a
"quasi-close" corporation. Though there were 122 shareholders, there
was no market for minority shares for the same reason that there is no
market for minority shares in a close corporation: no power, no market.
Even in Delaware, where squeeze-outs can be accomplished without a
business purpose, the majority nevertheless must demonstrate the "in-
herent fairness" of the bargain which encompasses "fair dealing" and
"fair price." 92 The preferential distribution of assets in Lampert Lumber
86 Id. at 354.
87 Id. at 355.
88 MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (1984).
89 Id. § 302A.011.
90 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass. 578, 590-92, 328 N.E.2d 505,
514-15 (1975).
91 Knauss, Corporate Governance -A Moving Target, 79 MICH. L. REV. 478, 481 (1981).
92 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983).
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could have been invalidated in Delaware under Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien .9
Minnesota threw another wrench into the development of effective
remedies for minority shareholders in Harris v. Mardan Business Systems,
Inc. ,94 in which the court held that the plaintiff, who had been induced by
the defendant to leave a secure position with Minnesota Mining & Manu-
facturing, was an employee, not a partner. According to the court, share-
holders in a close corporation, like partners in a partnership, owe
fiduciary duties to one another. However, "since partners do not owe a
fiduciary duty to employees, neither should shareholders." 95 Although
the plaintiff held five percent of the shares and had an option to acquire
five percent more, the court noted that the defendant had organized the
corporation himself and that the plaintiff had acquired his shares as part
of a compensation package. Thus, the plaintiff was an employee, not a
partner, and his relationship with the defendant was not controlled by
fiduciary principles.
It is paradoxical that, under the partnership analogy, holders of a
fifty-percent interest have been protected by the fiduciary duties imposed
upon those in control.96 Even holders of seventy-five percent of the
shares have had a cause of action against a twenty-five percent share-
holder who improperly exercised a veto power.97 Yet a ten-percent
holder goes unprotected under the initial holding in Harris. This holding
should be contrasted with the New York decisions finding "oppressive"
conduct which justified a judicially ordered buy-out when a person was
induced to leave employment elsewhere to join the defendant and was
later fired.98 The New York statute does require, however, a threshhold
of twenty percent to bring suit.
The Minnesota court's decision may be justified on an alternative
basis. Citing Wilkes, the Harris court pointed out that the defendant
demonstrated a legitimate business purpose for terminating Harris-
sales and morale in the United States operations which Harris supervised
were low, and Harris failed to follow proper business procedures. 99
Moreover, Harris was offered alternative employment as a regional sales
manager at the same salary and "ha[d] not suggested any less drastic
alternative." 100
Viewed from this perspective, Harris adds a helpful gloss to Wilkes.
In Wilkes, the court suggested that, if the majority had a legitimate busi-
ness purpose for their actions, it was open to the minority to suggest a
less drastic alternative. In Harris, the court accepted the majority's claim
that Harris was not competent to run the United States operations. Had
93 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
94 421 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
95 Id. at 353.
96 Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 402 Mass. 650, 524 N.E.2d 849 (1988); 68th Street Apartments, Inc. v.
Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 150 N.J. Super.
47, 374 A.2d 1222 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
97 Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981).
98 See infra notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
99 421 N.W.2d at 353.
100 Id.
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the majority shareholder simply fired Harris, he could have claimed he
was competent to handle a less demanding position and should have
been retained in some capacity. But here, the majority shareholder pre-
empted this argument by offering a lesser position which Harris declined
to accept.
Caution must be employed when the majority seeks to justify its con-
duct by resorting to the "legitimate business purpose" doctrine. While
several courts have approved Donahue's equal opportunity doctrine, 10 1
both Lampert Lumber and Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co. 102 have rejected
the doctrine, at least in part because of a business purpose justification.
Lampert Lumber has already been criticized for permitting the majority to
make preferential use of corporate assets; 103 Toner is of the same genre.
In Toner, two shareholders, Charles and Elma, each owned fifty per-
cent of the voting shares. Elma and her daughters also owned about fifty
percent of the nonvoting shares. Toner was Charles' sister and owned
about twenty percent of the nonvoting shares. Elma wanted to accept an
offer to sell the company's assets and then liquidate. However, Charles,
the president, wanted to continue the business in operation. Both
Charles and Toner wanted to acquire Elma's holdings but neither had
the requisite funds. Charles joined forces with-another director and
caused the corporation to borrow $300,000 to acquire Elma's nonvoting
shares; the other director then purchased her voting shares for $100,000.
The court recognized that majority shareholders have fiduciary obli-
gations in certain matters; 0 4 it declined, however, to find that a selective
purchase of shares by the majority is a per se breach of fiduciary duty.' 0 5
The court's rejection of a per se rule is acceptable: it postulated that one
minority shareholder could join a competitor and then use his share-
holder status to inspect the corporate books and records. In such a situa-
tion, the court opined that, should the corporation decide to purchase
the disloyal shareholder's shares, another minority shareholder ought
not to be able to use this situation to force the corporation to buy her
shares as well. 10 6
But the court then leapt from this example to justify withholding
relief from Toner on the basis that Charles and the other director be-
lieved it was in the best interests of the other shareholders to prevent
dissolution and maintain the business in operation. What the court
failed to recognize was that Charles and the other director could have
purchased the "business" out of a dissolution proceeding. In such a cir-
cumstance, Toner would have been, in effect, "bought out" and the two
directors could have leveraged the corporate assets to assist in financing
101 Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So. 2d 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Comolli v. Comolli, 241
Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 34, 482
N.E.2d 975 (1984).
102 304 Md. 256, 498 A.2d 642 (1985).
103 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
104 304 Md. at 267-68, 498 A.2d at 647-48.
105 Id. at 273, 498 A.2d at 650.
106 Id. at 276. 498 A.2d at 652.
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the purchase price. This practice is analyzed in the next section of this
Article. 10 7
Clearly, in those jurisdictions that recognize the partnership analogy
and hold controlling shareholders to stringent fiduciary duty standards,
the minority shareholder is in a much stronger position than she was
before the development of this body of law. However, except in rare
circumstances, 108 the minority shareholder remains "within" the corpo-
ration. While she may be able to challenge excessive compensation or
self-dealing under the duty of loyalty, and may challenge termination of
employment or heavy handedness under the shareholder fiduciary duty
concept, her presence in the corporation is clouded by the prospect of
continued litigation and the spectre of continued animosity. Objectively,
it may be better that the parties live apart. Therefore, the question be-
comes: may the minority shareholder retrieve the value of her invest-
ment in the corporation? Basically, two possibilities exist: dissolution of
the corporation or repurchase of the minority's shares by the corporation
or by the controlling shareholders.
III. Dissolution as a Resolution
At the turn of the century, corporation statutes did not provide for
dissolution of a corporation at the insistance of a minority share-
holder. 09 Judicial decisions generally declined to imply the power to
dissolve. However, in 1933, Illinois enacted its Business Corporation
Act which became the model for other states and for the Model Business
Corporation Act."10 Section 86 of the Illinois Act,' and comparable
provisions in other jurisdictions, gave the courts power to dissolve cor-
porations upon the petition of a shareholder if certain jurisdictional ele-
ments, particularly "oppressive" conduct by controlling shareholders,
were present. Unfortunately, courts hesitated to decree this relief which
they viewed as a "drastic remedy." Accordingly, the availability of this
form of relief for minority shareholders will turn upon what conduct is
oppressive and whether courts will view this relief as drastic.
A. Is Dissolution a Drastic Remedy?
The cases in which courts refer to dissolution or liquidation as a
drastic remedy, 1 2 if not legion, are certainly numerous. In characteriz-
ing dissolution as a drastic remedy, courts either (i) reflect a concession
107 See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
108 A rare exception would occur when those in control cause the corporation to repurchase their
own shares and the jurisdiction recognizes the Donahue equal opportunity doctrine, which requires
the purchase of the minority shareholder's shares as well. See supra note 101.
109 See, e.g., Reid Drug Co. v. Salyer, 268 Ky. 522, 105 S.W.2d 625 (1937); Fix v. Fix Material Co.,
538 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Bowman v. Gum, Inc., 321 Pa. 516, 184 A. 258 (1936).
110 See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
111 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 157.86 (1983). The Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983
repealed the 1933 Act. For the present grounds for judicial dissolution of a corporation, see ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 12.50 (1987).
112 ALEXIS search in the States library, Omni file, for "dissol! or liquidat! w/15 drastic or severe
w/50 corporation" produced 66 cases. This search also produced 30 cases respectively in the
Genfed library, Courts file.
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theory of corporate law by offering obeisance to the legislature: when an
artificial entity comes into existence through the will of the legislature,
courts ought not lightly to preside over the death of such an entity;"I 3 or
(ii) fail to recognize the distinction between dissolution and liquidation,
that is, they reflexively assume that death of the entity also signals the
death of the enterprise.' 14
The validity of the first possibility warrants little discussion since it
has almost no merit. The history of legislative activity for the past twenty
years or so has clearly evidenced a permissive or enabling approach by
the legislatures of the various states as opposed to a prescriptive ap-
proach. Delaware, generally considered a "management" state, has been
accused of leading a legislative "race for the bottom.""u 5 Even Illinois,
generally viewed as a "shareholder" state, amended its Constitution in
1970, inter alia, to eliminate the constitutional mandate for cumulative
voting that had been in effect since the adoption of its 1870 Constitu-
tion.116 Moreover, Illinois, in adopting its new Business Corporation Act
of 1983, arguably a "balanced" statute, was aware that "more and more
small and medium-sized Illinois corporations are being chartered outside
our state. '117 Legislatures are not seeking to control corporations as
much as to curry their favor. Thus, corporate statutes are not some legis-
lative hoop through which one must jump in order to be endowed by the
legislature with the privilege of doing business in the corporate form;
rather they are an attempt to provide a format in which business can
prosper, pay taxes, and employ voters.
1. Is Going Concern Value Lost in Dissolution?
The real reason that courts view dissolution as a drastic remedy is
the concern that death of the entity leads to death of the enterprise. In
other words, the fear is that dissolution inexorably leads to liquidation
which inexorably leads to destruction of the going concern and to the
sale of "dead" assets. Illustrative of this concern is the statement of the
Oregon Supreme Court in Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., affirming the
trial court's dismissal of a petition for dissolution, notwithstanding a
longstanding deadlock: "The plant employs about 65 men and there is a
public interest in preserving it as a going concern.""118
The court opined that the two parties would either settle their differ-
ences or would not. If they composed their differences amicably-fine; if
not, the court speculated:
113 See, e.g., Henry George & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper-George, Inc., 95 Wash. 2d 944, 948, 632 P.2d
512, 514 (1981) ("At common law, many courts refused to intervene in shareholder disputes since
the State licensed the corporation, and as such the State and not the courts had the authority to
dissolve the corporation.").
114 For evidence that this is not the case, see infra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
115 Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 665-66 (1974).
116 See ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1870); ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 6 (1970), Transition Sched. § 8.
117 Letter from Jim Edgar, Secretary of State of Illinois, to the Citizens of Illinois, reprinted in The
Business Corporation Act of 1983 (Secretary of State pamphlet 1984).
118 219 Or. 560, 586, 348 P.2d 9, 22 (1959).
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[W]e think that denial of relief at the present time may well lead to a
fairer buy-sell agreement than the remedy of enforced liquidation, a
remedy which might destroy the going concern value of the plant and
give both parties an unduly small return for the value of their
investment. 19
The court unfortunately offered no insight for its opinion that failure to
resolve differences amicably would lead to a fair buy-sell agreement.
History in the form of litigation in other jurisdictions indicates that such
optimism is not warranted. 120 Absent goodwill on the part of the major-
ity, it is unrealistic to expect that the party not in control will receive a
fair price, short of actual or potential judicial intervention. The notion of
fair price is predicated upon the model of arm's length bargaining be-
tween a willing buyer and a willing seller. But if the person in control has
no impetus to buy, and if the minority has no alternative market and thus
no leverage, we can expect that the price agreed upon will be heavily
weighted to the advantage of those in control. 12 1
Nevertheless, the Oregon court clearly believed that dissolution
would be disadvantageous to both parties because it would "destroy the
going concern value of the plant" and give each shareholder an unduly
small return on investment. The question, of course, is "who is going to
buy?" And the implicit answer of the Oregon court is "no one," at least
no one at a fair price.122
But generally there will be at least one potential buyer, namely, the
person or persons who were in control prior to the dissolution. A signifi-
cant issue will be the price that is paid. It rarely will be too high; it often
will be alleged to be too low. But the fairness or lack of fairness of price
impacts only the shareholders inter se. The real issue from a policy or
public interest standpoint is what is bought. If the assets are dismem-
bered in the sense that the enterprise is fragmented, the going concern
value lost, employees terminated, and products or services lost, then
there is a public concern with the termination of corporate existence. 123
Often with a third party bidder and invariably with a shareholder bidder,
however, what will be purchased from the liquidating corporation are the
assets of the enterprise as a going concern. In such a case, the only real
change, besides the elimination of the minority shareholders, will be the
119 Id. at 587, 348 P.2d at 22.
120 See infra notes 153-74 and accompanying text.
121 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass. 578, 592, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515
(1975) ("Majority 'freeze-out' schemes ... are designed to compel the minority to relinquish stock at
inadequate prices.").
122 For a different view of what occurs when a business is liquidated and the assets sold, see
Graham v. McAdoo, 135 Ky. 677, 684, 123 S.W. 260, 263 (1909), where the court stated:
[T]he chancellor will doubtless order the sale on such terms as to time as will enable either
party to purchase it if they desire, and this will insure such an active competition between
the factions, and perhaps others, for the property, as will insure that there will be no sacri-
fice of it at the sale.
123 This concern is reflected today in the somewhat analogous situation of tender offers in which
state legislatures are enacting antitakeover techniques to protect local corporations, and the jobs
they represent, from hostile bidders who sell off assets or terminate employees after the acquisition
in order to be able to service the debt that they incurred. See Waldman, New RJR Chief Faces a Daunt-
ing Challenge at Debt-Heavy Finn, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1989, at I, col. 6; Bartlett, New Type of Owner
Emerges in Wave of Company Buyouts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 3.
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name on the door. No employees will be terminated, nor any goods or
services lost.
This situation is illustrated in the context of a voluntary dissolution
in Lebold v. Inland Steel Co. 124 where Inland Steel, in its capacity as owner
of eighty percent of the shares of a captive steamship company, caused
the steamship company to be dissolved, bid on the three boats owned by
the steamship company at $1,120,000 (the acknowledged fair value of the
boats), distributed to the minority shareholders their pro rata portion of
the proceeds, and continued the transportation business of the steam-
ship company without interruption. The Inland Steel court found that the
so-called dissolution was merely a device whereby the steel company ap-
propriated the business of the steamship company to the detriment of
the minority shareholders of the steamship company. The Inland Steel
court recognized that there "was value over and above physical as-
sets"' 125 of the steamship company, namely, its "going concern" value,
and instructed the district court to compute damages based on the differ-
ence between the proceeds received by plaintiffs from the sale of assets
and the value of the steamship company as a going concern. 126
Inland'Steel demonstrates that dissolution is not necessarily synony-
mous with either destruction of the enterprise or with loss of going con-
cern value. To maintain the enterprise in existence or to recoup going
concern value, however, it is necessary that there be either a third party
bidder who values the business as a whole or a shareholder bidder who
has the wherewithal to continue the business and fund the purchase
price. 127
2. Financing the Buy-out of the Business as a Going Concern
At the risk of oversimplification, businesses can be divided into two
categories: those that are labor-intensive, such as service businesses, and
those that are capital-intensive, such as retail, wholesale, and manufac-
turing operations. 28 In a service operation, such as a real-estate broker-
age firm or an advertising firm, the real assets are the customers who
generally follow the individual principals as opposed to having loyalty to
the juristic entity. 12 9 In such a case, the most important "hard" asset
may be the lease on the premises where the business is conducted. Such
an asset often can be acquired merely by undertaking the future contrac-
tual obligation of the dissolved corporation on the lease. Thus, if the
124 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942).
125 Id. at 374.
126 I- at 375.
127 The enterprise can be continued even if pricing is predicated upon a distress sale situation;
however, in this situation, as foreseen by the court in Nicolai-Neppach, the shareholders, in reality
only the nonpurchasing shareholders, would receive an unduly small return for their investment. To
realize going-concern value, either a competitive bidding, nondistress environment is necessary or,
with respect to a shareholder bidder, some legal constraint must be in place to insure that a fair price
is paid.
128 The dichotomy between these two types of businesses, and the implications for minority
shareholders, is discussed infra notes 153-74 and accompanying text.
129 See, e.g., DuaneJones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954); Brill, In the J1I'rfor
Dick Lord's Ad Agency, Tough W11asn't Snart, Am. Law., May 1988, at 30.
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service business was viable prior to dissolution, it will most likely con-
tinue, in one form or another, after dissolution.
With respect to capital-intensive businesses, the key to continuation
is financing. As the leveraged buy-outs of the last few years have demon-
strated, if a business is successful, its acquisition can be financed, even if
the sums are enormous.13 0 The management of public companies, hold-
ing only a small percentage of the shares, has often managed to fund the
buy-out of the public shareholders, in part from the ability of the com-
pany's assets to provide security for financing the buy-out. 131
In a closely-held corporation, if a shareholder, rather than a third
party, is the purchaser, all that needs to be financed, in effect, is the inter-
est of the out going shareholder. If, for example, the plaintiff is a twenty-
percent shareholder and the value of the business is one-hundred units,
all that need be financed is twenty units. On the other hand, if the falling
out is between two fifty-percent shareholders, then fifty units must be
financed. Failure to understand these simple economics may account for
the hesitancy of courts and legislatures to entertain dissolution at the suit
of a "small" minority shareholder.' 32 Because liquidation is viewed as a
drastic remedy, courts apparently conclude that a shareholder with a
modest stake should not be able to set in motion such an untoward
event. On the other hand, if dissolution is simply viewed as financing the
buy-out of the minority interest, the smaller the interest, the simpler the
financing.
Key factors in determining whether a shareholder can acquire the
business after dissolution are: (i) the shareholder's personal financial sit-
uation; (ii) the percentage interest of the outgoing shareholder; (iii) the
extent to which the assets of the business are already leveraged; and, (iv)
the method of valuation. Obviously, if the shareholder has access per-
sonally to funds adequate for the acquisition, there is no problem. In
many instances, however, the bulk of the personal assets of a shareholder
in a closely-held corporation is tied up in the corporation.' 3 3 Thus, in
most cases, the other three factors will be controlling.
As indicated previously, the impact of the first of these factors, the
percentage holding of the minority, varies directly with the size of the
holding. If the percentage held by the minority is small, the difficulty in
financing that part of the business represented by the minority interests
will also be small. Yet, a 1977 study 34 indicates that the relationship
between the size of the minority interest and the likelihood of the courts
granting relief when involuntary dissolution is sought is an inverse rela-
tionship: the smaller the interest, the less likely the grant of relief. From
130 See Wallace, Complex Ties in Battle for Nabisco, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1988, at D7, col. 1; Sterngold,
Suitors Quarrel Over RJR Nabisco, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1988, at D1, col. 2; Kilbom Takeovers: A Friendly
Climate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
131 See supra note 130.
132 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 56, at 31 ("It thus appears that the judicial reluctance to
order dissolution is most clearly manifested in suits by small minorities."). In addition, some stat-
utes condition suits for dissolution upon the petitioner holding a threshold percentage of shares.
See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a (McKinney 1986) (20%).
133 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.02 (3d ed. 1988).
134 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 56.
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the standpoint of the conventional wisdom that dissolution is a drastic
remedy, this result is rational: if the economic stake-is small, it does not
warrant extraordinary relief. But in reality, the result is irrational: that
which can most easily be accomplished is least often undertaken. As a
result of the courts' failure to understand the true impact of dissolution,
we have the paradoxical situation in which the shareholder with the least
leverage-who is thus most in need of judicial intervention-is the least
likely to obtain relief.
The second factor, the degree to which the assets are already lever-
aged, is relevant because of the impact it has upon the ability of the buy-
ing shareholder to generate funds from the assets of the business to fund
the pay-out to the minority shareholder. For example, if the adjusted
book value of the business is one-hundred units, working capital is a
wash, and the fixed assets of two-hundred units are encumbered by se-
curity interests of one-hundred units-and if the nature of the business
and character of the assets would warrant moving the financing level
from fifty to sixty-five percent-the additional thirty units of cash gener-
ated by the refinancing would be sufficient to buy-out a thirty-percent
shareholder, assuming the value of the shareholder's interest was predi-
cated upon adjusted book value.135 On the other hand, if the assets were
already leveraged with 110 units of debt, refinancing could only generate
20 units of cash. Further, if the assets were already leveraged at the 130
level, no additional funds could be generated unless the lenders could be
induced to take a less secure position by providing greater than sixty-five
percent financing.
Finally, the last factor, the method of valuation, is relevant because
of the impact it has on the size of the payout to minority interests, which
in turn affects the ease of financing. The previous example was predi-
cated upon an adjusted book value method of valuation. If the assets,
however, are sold to a control shareholder at less than the appraised
value, this would facilitate such shareholder's ability to fund the payout
for the minority interest. Nonetheless, the ease of financing for the ma-
jority should not be a relevant factor in valuing the minority's interest.
With reference to the foregoing example, if the assets were valued at
177 units instead of 200, and if they were still encumbered with 110 units
of debt, the interest of the minority would be 30% x (177-110), or 20
units. In other words, with a lower valuation upon liquidation, the con-
trol shareholder would be able to fund the payout of the minority share-
holder even with the business being more highly leveraged prior to the
dissolution. On the other hand, should the assets be valued higher than
the adjusted book value, for example, to reflect capitalized earnings as a
going concern, the burden of funding the payout by the majority for the
minority interest would be exacerbated, rather than facilitated.
What the foregoing examples illustrate is that the judicial expecta-
tion that dissolution and death are synonymous is not sound, even from a
135 "Adjusted book value" means the book value of a company but with "adjustments" to reflect
the current value of investment-type assets, land and buildings, and equipment. See S. PRArr, VALU-
ING A BUSINESS-THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY-HELD COMPANIES 70-71 (198 1).
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theoretical standpoint. We would expect that service businesses, or capi-
tal-intensive businesses that are not overly leveraged, should continue in
existence even after the juristic entity in which they were held has been
dissolved. The question then becomes whether reality accords with such
an expectation.
3. Myth v. Reality: Dissolved Businesses Do Continue
Professors Hetherington and Dooley, in their 1977 study, obtained
data on over fifty cases in which involuntary dissolution was sought.1 36
In twenty-five cases, plaintiffs were unsuccessful; 37 in twenty-seven
cases, either the complaint was sustained on appeal or some form of re-
lief was awarded. 138 Where the plaintiffs were successful, in only six of
twenty-seven cases was the business liquidated. 139 In twenty cases, the
business was sold, either to the other shareholders (seventeen cases)140
or to a third party (three cases).' 41 Even where the court declined to
grant dissolution, the business was liquidated in three instances. 142 In
fourteen cases, the plaintiffs were bought out 143 and in two cases the
business was sold to a third party. 144 The conclusion to be drawn from
this data is that death of the enterprise when a business is liquidated is
the exception rather than the rule. On the other hand, even where relief
in the form of dissolution is not granted, the business may not survive.
What is also instructive is the background in the nine cases of fifty-
two' 4 5 in which the business was liquidated. Of the six cases where the
business was liquidated following the grant of affirmative relief to the
plaintiff, three involved marginal or failing businesses. It is not unlikely
that these businesses would have been liquidated anyway. Witness the
fact that liquidation occurred in three cases in which the plaintiff was de-
nied relief, two of which involved marginal or failing businesses. 146 It is
questionable, therefore, whether the formal act of judicial dissolution
has any significant impact upon whether the business ultimately will be
liquidated. If the business is viable, it will be continued, either by the
other shareholders or a third party; if the business is not viable, it will be
terminated, irrespective ofjudicial action or inaction.
This conclusion is reinforced by recasting the Hetherington and
Dooley data regarding the nine firms that they treated as having been
liquidated. In three cases, the businesses were continued after liquida-
tion and, in another, the business was at least partially continued. One
136 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 56, at 30, 64-75 (tables).
137 Id. at 30, 64-69 (table I). Note that Professors Hetherington and Dooley included two cases
for which information regarding the final disposition was unavailable in their total number of cases
in which the plaintiff was unsuccessful. Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion, these two
cases have been omitted.
138 Id. at 30, 70-75 (table II).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 31, 64-69 (table I).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 33.
146 Id. at 33, 64-69 (table I, cases 6, 9).
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case involved a profitable apartment building that was sold to a third
party; another, a network of family corporations that was apportioned
among the shareholders; and a third, successful service businesses that
were operated separately after dissolution. 147 The case in which there
was a partial continuation was one in which the defendant was involved
in a competing firm which acquired some of the dissolved corporation's
business.1 48 When the data is recast in this light, it is evident that only
the failing or marginal businesses failed to survive. One could conclude
that not only does judicial dissolution have no significant impact upon
whether a business will survive or die, it has none at all.
B. Is Dissolution an Effective Remedy?
Still, while dissolution is not a drastic remedy, neither is it necessar-
ily an effective remedy. Its lack of effectiveness from the standpoint of a
minority shareholder stems from two related factors. The first factor is
that dissolution impacts minority shareholders disparatively, depending
upon the nature of the business. Some of the adverse repercussions of
this factor could be mitigated were it not for the second factor: the disso-
lution concept, so long as it is viewed as corporate death, is inconsistent
with a valuation theory that would provide minority shareholders with a
fair price.
1. Circumstances in Which It Is Better to Be "Locked-In" Than
"Bought Out"
According to conventional wisdom, the primary vulnerability of a
minority shareholder is the spectre of being "locked-in," that is, having a
perpetual investment in an entity without any expectation of ever receiv-
ing a return on that investment. That this spectre is both real and devas-
tating cannot be gainsaid. There are circumstances, however, in which
the minority does not want to "go out," at least at the price which is in pros-
pect. If what the minority would receive upon dissolution is the "dead
asset" value, and if the "going concern" value is markedly higher, the
minority might prefer to run the risk of being temporarily "locked in" in
order to realize greater gains in the future. 149 For example, if the busi-
ness is one that might be attractive to a third party buyer, and if condi-
tions are such that the majority might be interested in a subsequent sale,
the minority might prefer to "wait it out" rather than be forced to con-
vert its interest currently to cash.150 This example assumes that, in the
short run, were the business to be dissolved, it would be purchased by
the majority interests. It also assumes that the price paid by the majority
would reflect "adjusted book value,"15 1 or something less, rather than
"going concern" value.' 52
147 Id at 32-33, 70-75 (table II, cases 16, 1 & 10).
148 Id. at 33, 70-75 (table II, case 13).
149 See infra notes 153-74 and accompanying text.
150 Cf Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987); Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d
1185 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986).
151 See supra note 135.
152 See infra text following note 317.
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At the risk of over simplification, the foregoing can be illustrated by
drawing a distinction between a profitable service or labor-intensive busi-
ness, on the one hand, and an unprofitable capital-intensive business on
the other. Two leading New York cases from the 1950-1960 period
dramatize this dichotomy.
In In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc. ,153 the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed dismissal of a petition on the ground of deadlock. Radom, the
petitioner, owned fifty percent of the shares, and Neidorff, his sister and
the respondent, owned the other fifty percent following the death of her
husband. The brother and the husband had worked well together; how-
ever, the brother and sister, to state it euphemistically, were estranged.
When the petition was filed, it listed the assets and liabilities of the cor-
poration as follows:' 54
Assets Liabilities
Machinery & supplies $ 9,500 Payable (to Radom) $17,000
Cash 82,000
Total 91,500
Thus, the liquidating value of the corporation appeared to be $74,500.
The sister, based upon these figures, would have received $37,250.
When the husband was alive, however, both he and the brother drew
salaries of $25,000. From the cash position of the corporation listed
above, it would appear that the corporation had been profitable. If the
services of the husband did not need to be replaced, not an unlikely as-
sumption, 55 the corporation would be all the more profitable. Shortly
after the husband's death, Radom offered his sister $75,000 for her inter-
est and, upon her rejection of the offer, "threatened to have the corpora-
tion dissolved and to buy it in at a low price or, if she should be the
purchaser, that he would start a competing business."' 5 6 Three years
later, it was undisputed that corporate profits for those years had totalled
$242,000, an average of $71,000 per year according to the court, and
that the corporation had cash on deposit of $300,000. It is not clear
whether the foregoing figures had made allowance for the brother's sal-
ary of $25,000 per year. Thus, three years later-even if the court were
then to liquidate the corporation-the sister's interest had risen to the
$150,000 range, 5 7 as contrasted with the $75,000 the brother had of-
fered and the $37,000 she might have received had dissolution been
granted promptly and the brother been able to "buy it in at a low price"
or at the book value figure suggested by the brother's petition. The
value of this business as a going concern, based upon a capitalized earn-
ings approach, theoretically could be substantially higher. If a relatively
153 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
154 Id. at 5, 119 N.E.2d at 564.
155 There was no indication in the case that a replacement was hired.
156 307 N.Y. at 6, 119 N.E.2d at 564.
157 Profits in the interim were $242,000 and the corporation had $300,000 on deposit in banks.
Id.
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modest price earnings ratio of five' 58 were applied to the average earn-
ings of $71,000 for the past three years, the value thus determined would
be $355,000, or $177,500 for the sister's half interest. Similarly; a multi-
plier of eight would produce a value of $284,000 for the sister's
investment.
What the foregoing analysis demonstrates is the tremendous varia-
tion in value that can exist, depending upon timing and method. Thus:
Valuation Approach Timing Value
Liquidation at book Upon filing $ 37,250
Brother's offer Upon H's death 75,000
Liquidation at book Three years later 150,000
Capitalized earnings 5 Hypothesized 177,500
Capitalized earnings 8 Hypothesized 284,000
Such variations are not uncommon.' 59 What is clear is that liquidation
immediately following the filing of the brother's petition would have
been extremely disadvantageous for the sister. This conclusion-that
liquidation is disadvantageous to the minority-would generally follow
whenever the ratio of profitability to capital is high and the sale of the
assets in dissolution does not take into account going concern value. It is
all the more true when profitability is increasing.
On the other hand, when the converse is true-that is, when the ra-
tio of profitability to capital is low-dissolution will generally be advanta-
geous to the minority, assuming that the minority is not employed in the
enterprise. This is illustrated by the later New York case of Kruger v.
Gerth 16 0 in which the New York Court of Appeals again upheld dismissal
of a petition for dissolution. In Kruger, the petition was brought by the
widow of Kruger, a forty-six percent shareholder. Arthur Gerth, the pri-
mary respondent, owned fifty-three percent of the shares of the corpora-
tion. Both Kruger, before his death in 1961, and Gerth had been
employed by the corporation. Kruger, who had been ill since 1951 and
was not active in the business, received a salary of $6,000; Gerth, for the
past four years, had received compensation averaging slightly over
$15,000 per year, consisting of $9,000 salary and $6,000 bonus. The net
worth (or book value) of the corporation was over $100,000; however, its
earnings were less than $2,000 before income taxes. Thus, the return on
investment was about two percent annually. The petitioner sought disso-
lution on the ground that the award of bonuses to Gerth so reduced the
profits of the corporation that there were insufficient earnings to provide
a fair return on the plaintiff's investment in the corporation. 161 The
Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the Appellate Division on the basis
that the grounds for the petition were meager.
158 The cases discussed in this Article utilize multipliers ranging from 4.48 to 15.2. See infra notes
329-30 and accompanying text.
159 Id.
160 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965) (mem.), a g 22 A.D.2d 916, 255
N.Y.S.2d 498 (1964).
161 Id. at 803, 210 N.E.2d at 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 1.
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ChiefJudge Desmond, who had written for the majority in In re Ra-
dom & Neidorff in rejecting dissolution, this time dissented and argued for
dissolution on the basis that "the corporation is being kept alive solely to
pay [Gerth's] salary plus bonus."' 162 He suggested that even though the
bonuses were not extravagant, the effect of the bonus was to render
plaintiff's stock "both unprofitable and unsalable"' 63 and thus consti-
tuted a breach of the fiduciary duty owed by majority shareholders to the
minority. Judge Fuld, who dissented in both cases, relied upon Professor
Israels' argument in The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence 164 that a close
corporation should be treated like a partnership and that courts should
be able to decree a remedy which would produce a fair result.' 65
Kruger v. Gerth is a classic example of a "locked-in" minority share-
holder. In effect, Kruger and Gerth invested in a business to provide
each with jobs. So long as each was employed, the situation was accepta-
ble. The return on capital took the form of payment of salaries. But
when Kruger died, the widow received no return, either by way of salary
or dividends. Thus, her capital was now being used to maintain employ-
ment for Gerth.
The majority was unswayed by the argument that such a situation
justified dissolution. This was in line with how one would expect most
courts to react-at least prior to the development of the "reasonable ex-
pectations" test. 166 In theory, one chooses the corporate form because it
provides continuity of existence: death does not terminate the corporate
form as it would a partnership. 167 According to this line of reasoning, if
Kruger wanted his investment in the enterprise to be made available to
his widow upon his death, he should have chosen the partnership form.
Under traditional analysis, 168 the widow has little legal leverage
available to her. Even in terms of 1960 dollars, compensation of$15,000
is not so exorbitant as to give rise to challenge as oppressive or as a waste
of corporate assets, possible bases for judicial dissolution. 69 Nor does
the widow have the corporate leverage to create deadlock, another basis
for dissolution.' 70 While the widow could challenge the salary as unfair
within the scope of a conflict of interest statute,' 7' recovery of any excess
compensation does not necessarily mean that such excess recovered by
the corporation would thereafter be distributed to her as a dividend. 172
Thus, in the Kruger situation, where the ratio of profitability to capi-
tal is low, dissolution would be an effective remedy. Since the likelihood
162 Id. at 804, 210 N.E.2d at 356, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
163 Id.
164 See supra note 2.
165 16 N.Y.2d at 806, 210 N.E.2d at 357, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
166 See infra text following note 271.
167 See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 31(4), 6 U.L.A. 376 (1969).
168 The traditional analysis views dissolution as a drastic remedy. See supra text following note
112.
169 See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 14.30(2)(ii), (iv) (1984).
170 See id. § 14.30(2)(i), (iii). (In Kruger, the widow held only 46% of the shares.).
171 Id. § 8.31.
172 See infra notes 334-36 and accompanying text.
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of increased profitability is lOW, 17 3 there is no advantage to "staying in,"
absorbing the lack of current return in expectation of a greater pay-off
later. Yet, in this situation where liquidation could make economic
sense-at least from the perspective of the minority shareholder-it has
been often, if not generally, unavailable. 174
2. Does "Corporate Death" Lead to a "Dead Asset" Approach to
Valuation
What is clear from a comparison of Radom and Kruger is that there is
no general rule that dissolution is an effective remedy. While it would
have been helpful to the widow in Kruger, it would have been disastrous
for the sister in Radom. The reason why dissolution would have been
disastrous to the sister in Radom is that the court contemplated, appar-
ently, that she would receive the dead asset value of the business assets.
The inventory to which the court made reference listed as assets machin-
ery and supplies worth $9,500 and cash of $82,000. There is no indica-
tion of anything representing a going concern value. The value of the
equipment was probably the depreciated book value, not the market
value.
Let me transpose the Radom facts to a business with which we are all
familiar-a real estate brokerage firm, or an insurance brokerage firm, or
a law practice. In such a case, if the office is leased, the hard assets (the
$9,500 in Radom) would consist of desks, file cabinets, and, in the past,
typewriters, but today, computers and copy machines. But, in a sense,
the real value is in the file cabinets-not in the $250 of metal but in the
paper inside: the client files, listings, and other business development
data.
Generally, the going concern value of these businesses is substan-
tially greater than the tangible asset value. Often a simple formula, such
as two times gross sales or cash flow, is used to value such businesses.
While business valuation experts criticize such formulas and prefer to
work with earnings based formulae,1 75 earnings in closely held busi-
nesses are so distorted by owner compensation that actual buyers often
look to more objective data such as gross billings. However, either a
gross sales or net income approach will generally produce a valuation
above tangible assets.
The problem, then, is how to realize value upon a sale in a dissolu-
tion proceeding. In a voluntary dissolution, the officers and directors are
charged with selling the assets of the company. 176 Were they to buy in at
a low price, as the brother in Radom threatened to do, 177 there would be
a conflict of interest, 78 and the sister, in a derivative proceeding, argua-
173 According to ChiefJudge Desmond, dissenting in Kruger, "there is (as testified by the majority
stockholder) no prospect of the corporation ever making enough profit to pay any dividend...." 16
N.Y.2d at 804, 210 N.E.2d at 356, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
174 In addition to Kruger, see Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
175 G. MCCARTHY & R. HEALY, VALUING A COMPANY-PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 377 (1971).
176 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 14.05(a)(2), (b)(3) (1984).
177 See supra text accompanying note 156.
178 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1984).
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bly could require the brother to pay a fair price. This is what the Seventh
Circuit mandated in Lebold v. Inland Steel Co. 179 In a similar case, the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court stated that "the burden is on the liquidator as a
fiduciary not only to prove the good faith of the transactions involved but
also to show their inherent fairness from the viewpoint of both the ma-
jority and minority shareholders."' 180
In an involuntary dissolution case, however, there is a likelihood that
the court will appoint a receiver to sell the assets.181 From the minority
shareholder's standpoint, there is no assurance that the receiver will be
either diligent or sophisticated. From the receiver's perspective in a Ra-
dom situation, the simplest procedure is to sell to the brother-at
whatever price the brother offers. This is undoubtedly what the brother
in Radom had in mind.
This uncritical approach to realizing value is possible so long as
courts view the dissolution process as a drastic remedy resulting in 'judi-
cially-imposed [corporate] death."' 182 It need not, and ought not, be so
viewed. Eighty years ago, a court upheld what was, in effect, a dissolu-
tion of a corporation based upon oppression and stated:
[T]he chancellor will doubtless order the sale on such terms as to time
as will enable either party to purchase it if they desire, and this will
insure such an active competition between the factions, and perhaps
others, for the property, as will insure that there will be no sacrifice of
it at the sale. 18 3
A similar theme was echoed forty years ago when the Missouri Supreme
Court, in ordering dissolution of a corporation, stated that "[s]ince it has
a successful going business, which should be preserved and continued, it
should be sold as such if possible. Furthermore, if the parties can agree
upon a sale of the interest of one to the other.., they should be permit-
ted to do SO."184 Contemporary courts should be no less astute in recog-
nizing that dissolution is not the end of the world and insuring that
procedures are in place to preserve to the minority the fair value of the
corporate assets.
IV. Oppression as a Basis for Dissolution
As discussed above, there are two interrelated impediments to disso-
lution as an effective remedy for minority shareholders. The first is its
availability. So long as courts look at a dissolution as the death of the
corporation and conclude that it is a drastic remedy, the likelihood of
dissolution being decreed by a court is curtailed. Witness the Hethering-
179 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942).
180 Levy v. Billeaud, 443 So. 2d 539, 541 (La. 1983).
181 MODEL BusNESS CORP. ACT §§ 14.31(c), 14.32 (1984).
182 In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 7, 119 N.E.2d 563, 565 (1954).
183 Graham v. McAdoo, 135 Ky. 677, 684, 123 S.W. 260, 263 (1909) (one shareholder had arro-
gated control to his family in a fashion analogous to the leading Illinois oppression case, Gidwitz v.
Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960)).
184 Handlan v. Handlan, 360 Mo. 1150, 1167, 232 S.W.2d 944, 951 (1950) (liquidation sale de-
ferred for six months to allow the deadlocked brothers the opportunity to develop their own
solution).
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ton & Dooley study: dissolution was granted in only half the cases.' 85
Also, so long as dissolution is viewed as corporate death, the minority
shareholder may fear that what he or she will receive is the "dead asset"
value of the corporation, not the going concern value of the business.18 6
The sister, in Radom & Neidorf might well not have resisted dissolution if
she had known she would receive her half of the going concern value of
the business that her husband, as well as her brother, had developed.
While alternatives to dissolution must be developed to complete the
picture of effective minority relief, dissolution today is still the prevalent
relief afforded minority shareholders by legislatures. 8 7 For the widow in
Kruger v. Gerth, something is better than nothing. As long as the corpora-
tion exists, she has neither her investment nor any return. With little
going concern value, dissolution, even if it meant dead asset value, was
the best for which she could hope.
Accordingly, it is worthwhile to examine the traditional four bases
for involuntary judicial dissolution to evaluate them for their potential to
afford relief. Section 90 of the original Model Business Corporation Act
provided as follows:
The ... courts shall have full power to liquidate the assets and busi-
ness of a corporation:
(a) In an action by a shareholder when it is established:
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the cor-
porate affairs and the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock,
and that irreparable injury to the corporation is being suffered or is
threatened by reason thereof; or
(2) That the acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation
are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent; or
(3) That the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and have
failed, for a period which includes at least two consecutive annual
meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have ex-
pired or would have expired upon the election of their successors; or
(4) That the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.' 88
185 See supra note 56.
186 Recall that the brother in In re Radom & Neidorff had threatened to have the corporation
dissolved and to buy it in at a low price. See supra text accompanying note 156.
187 Only about 20 states have statutes providing for alternative remedies to dissolution. See infra
notes 243-70 and accompanying text.
188 In October, 1946, the Committee on the Law of Corporations of the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) submitted its final draft of a Model Business Corporation Act to the ABA's Section on
Corporation, Banking and Mercantile Law. See A Model Business Corporation Act, I Bus. LAw. 6 (No. 2,
1946). This Model Act was revised and resubmitted to the Section on Corporation, Banking and
Business Law in November, 1950. In the introduction to the 1950 Model Act, specific attention was
called to the provisions of the Act on receiverships and liquidations. It was observed that, in the case
of a management deadlock, for example, "at the instance of a shareholder, a receiver may be ap-
pointed to preserve the corporate assets and, if the deadlock is not broken, eventually liquidate the
business, whereupon the court may then dissolve the corporation." Id. at 7. Further, it was ob-
served that, "thejurisdiction and authority of the state courts might be in doubt if there is no express
statutory provision." Id. See Garrett, History, Purpose and Summary of the Model Business Corporation Act,
6 Bus. LAw. 1, 6-7 (No. 1, 1950). As promulgated in 1950, § 90(a) of the Model Act contained only
three subsections. While §§ 90(a)(1), (2) & (4), as set forth in the text preceeding note 188, ap-
peared, verbatim, as §§ 90(a)(1), (2) & (3) in the 1950 Model Act, there was no provision regarding
shareholder deadlock and the resultant failure to elect directors. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT,
§ 90, reprinted in 6 Bus. LAw. 75 (1950). The Model Act was again revised in 1953. See MODEL
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One deadlock-type basis-shareholders failing to elect a successor
for two annual meeting dates-is not calculated to stir the blood of a
sitting judge. 8 9 It invites the query "So what? Who is hurt?" For that
reason, Illinois dropped this provision in its new Business Corporation
Act. 190
The other deadlock provision-directors deadlocked and the corpo-
ration suffering irreparable injury-has been the source of relief but it is
not nearly the effective remedy that Professor Israels foresaw. 19' This
provision has two hurdles. One is the fact that the jurisdictional lan-
guage is permissive, not mandatory. The introductory language of the
section provides that courts "shall have full power" to liquidate, not that
courts "shall liquidate," if the enumerated bases are present. 92 The sec-
ond problem is that deadlock is not sufficient; there must be irreparable
injury to the corporation. But injury to the shareholder does not neces-
sarily mean injury to the corporation. 193 In fact, the converse may be
true. A minority shareholder may be terminated and a replacement hired
at a lower salary, or possibly not replaced at all. Often a shareholder will
become disabled or die, and thereafter the spouse or other family mem-
ber will not succeed to the employed position. This was the case in Ra-
dom and in Kruger v. Gerth. Exclusion from employment and absence of
dividend declarations do not injure the corporation. For this reason, the
BUSINESS CORP. AcT xi (1957) (Preface to the 1953 Revision). The 1953 revisions added § 90(a)(3),
bringing § 90 to the form seen in the text preceeding note 188.
In 1969, the Committee on Corporate Laws of the ABA again revised the Model Act. In the
course of this revision, the text of § 90 remained unchanged but the section was renumbered as
§ 97. See Official Forms for Use Under the Model Business Corporation Act-1969 Addendum and
Conversion Table 105; MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 97 (1969). The text of § 97 remained the
same over the years, until the Committee on Corporate Laws undertook and completed a major
revision and restructuring of the Model Act. These efforts culminated in the current Model Business
Corporation Act (1984). The 1984 Model Act completely redrafted the provisions on judicial disso-
lution, which are now contained at §§ 14.30-14.33.
189 For example, in Henry George & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper-George, Inc., 95 Wash. 2d 944, 632
P.2d 512 (1981), the court held that merely meeting the jurisdictional test of having failed to elect
successor directors at two successive annual meetings does not warrant dissolution of a solvent cor-
poration; rather it is necessary to determine whether dissolution is in the best interests of the share-
holders. See also Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Or. 560, 348 P.2d 9 (1959). However, where
egregious facts are coupled with deadlock, courts are more likely to grant dissolution. See, e.g., In re
Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 382, 70 A.2d 159 (1949); In re EveningJournal Ass'n, 15 N.J. Super. 58, 83
A.2d 38 (1951); Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, Inc., 273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.2d 389 (1956).
190 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 12.50(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
191 Israels, supra note 2, at 789-91.
192 The court stated in NVicolai-Neppach, 219 Or. at 566, 348 P.2d at 16:
The shareholder deadlock provisions of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, of the Model
Business Corporation Act, and of the Oregon Business Corporation Law are clearly
couched in language of permission. It is incredible that the many able lawyers who worked
from time to time on these three identical acts would have used such phraseology to ex-
press a mandate. The statute contemplates that the court of equity shall take jurisdiction
once a requisite showing of fact is made and contemplates further that having taken juris-
diction it will bring its discretion to bear in granting or refusing to grant equitable relief.
The very fact that the legislature has made the remedy of liquidation a matter of discretion
for the courts is a mandate to us to use discretion, and we would not be carrying out the
legislative will by simply decreeing liquidation as a matter of course once the jurisdictional
facts and nothing more are proven.
193 Some courts have, however, essentially ignored the requirement of irreparable injury to the
corporation and focused upon injury to shareholders. See, e.g., Gillingham v. Swan Falls Land &
Cattle. Co., 106 Idaho 859, 683 P.2d 895 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).
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Model Act was modified in 1984 to provide an alternative basis to irrepa-
rable injury to the corporation: "the business and affairs of the corpora-
tion can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders
generally."' 9 4 This language should expand the utility of the deadlock
provision.
The provision that empirically seems to be the most fruitful avenue
for minority shareholders to pursue, however, is one using a finding of
oppression as the basis for liquidation. 195 While the provision also
speaks of illegal and fraudulent acts, the courts have consistently ob-
served that, not only is oppression a concept separate and distinct from
fraud and illegality, but also that it embraces conduct that would not be
encompassed within those terms. 196 While the fourth jurisdictional ba-
sis, waste or misapplication of corporate assets, probably would stir the
blood of a sitting judge, its specificity narrows the situations that it can
reach-terminating a minority shareholder is unlikely to involve waste-
and judicial decisions appear to incorporate conduct within its reach into
the concept of oppression.' 97 Accordingly, the next two sections of this
Article will explore the development of the concept of oppression and its
evolution to embrace the "reasonable expectations of minority
shareholders."
A. The Development of the Concept of Oppression
1. Illinois
Until the 1980s, the most significant developments in the concept of
oppression occurred in Illinois. Thereafter, New York adopted the rea-
sonable expectations test which will be discussed in the next section.'98
The Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1933199 (the" 1933 Act") is
often viewed as the first modem corporation code and was the basis for
the Model Business Corporation Act.200 Section 86(a)(3) of the 1933 Act
was the basis for section 90(a)(2), later section 97(a)(2), and finally sec-
tion 14.30(2)(ii) of the various versions of the Model Act,20 ' and intro-
duced the concept of oppression as a basis for liquidation. 202
194 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 14.30(2)(i) (1984).
195 See Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960); Central
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill. 2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1957).
196 See supra note 195.
197 Id.
198 See infra text accompanying notes 271-88.
199 1933 Ill. Laws 308-87. Illinois is generally credited with introducing "oppression" as a basis
for liquidation in its 1933 Act. See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 150-
51, 400 A.2d 554, 559 (1979). However, in 1931, California enacted a provision that would permit
dissolution if directors were guilty of "persistent unfairness" to minority shareholders. 1931 Cal.
Stat. 1829. Later California decisions have, in effect, equated persistent unfairness to oppression.
This provision did not persist; it was deleted from the statute. 1933 Cal. Stat. 1414. Professor
Ballantine, who has had a strong influence on California law, is a major opponent to involuntary
dissolution. See 2 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAws § 360 (4th ed.
1974).
200 See Garrett, Model Business Corporation Act, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 412, 424 (1952); MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AcT 84 (1953 revision).
201 See supra note 188.
202 Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill, 2d 566, 572, 141 N.E.2d 45, 49 (1957).
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
In interpreting the scope of "oppression" under section 86 of the
1933 Act, no clear pattern developed until the 1960s. Two early cases
either held20 3 or appeared willing to accept 20 4 that a sale of corporate
assets at a grossly inadequate price was oppressive conduct. Two later
cases gave only summary consideration to whether conduct was oppres-
sive. 205 However, in 1957, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the
concept of oppression and took a very broad view. In Central Standard Life
Insurance Co. v. Davis, the court stated: "[W]e reject defendants' argu-
ment that the word [oppression] is substantially synonymous with 'illegal
and fraudulent.' Misapplication of assets or mismanagement of funds are
not, as we read the statute, indispensable ingredients of 'oppressive' con-
duct." 20 6 Nevertheless, the court declined to liquidate a hotel corpora-
tion, as sought by a shareholder holding over half the preferred shares,
even though no dividends had been paid for a quarter of a century. This
meant that the defendant, who owned substantially all the common
shares and also the operating company which leased the hotel, had been
arrogating all the financial benefits to himself. Counterbalancing this
possible conflict of interest was the fact that the plaintiff had bought its
shares at a discount; the court questioned whether the plaintiff was op-
pressed and stated that "[e]quity will not award the drastic relief here
sought in order to aid a plaintiff in what might be a profitable specula-
tion." 20 7 In addition, the lease was expiring in two years and there were
indications that a favorable lease restoring profitability might be avail-
able at that point.
The rhetoric providing a broad gloss in defining oppression bore
fruit three years later when the court confronted another alleged case of
oppression. Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co. 208 involved a corporation
in which the shares were evenly split between two dissident family fac-
tions. The president of the corporation had, for almost ten years, oper-
ated it as though it were a sole proprietorship. The following factors
combined to indicate oppression within the meaning of the statute: of-
ficers were hired and salary increases were given without director ap-
proval; loans were made to corporations in which the president had an
interest without director approval; a subsidiary was organized without di-
rector approval; the matter of payment of dividends had not been
presented to the board of directors; and the other family was excluded
from all incidents of control and corporate participation. The court
pointed out that it was "not necessary that fraud, illegality or even loss be
shown to exhibit oppression" 20 9 and concluded that the cumulative ef-
fects of the aforementioned acts, and their indicated continuing nature,
203 Long v. Wilson Stove & Mfg. Co., 277 Ill. App. 57 (1934).
204 Sulinski v. Humboldt & Wabansia Bldg. Corp., 315 Ill. App. 392, 43 N.E.2d 181 (1942).
205 Marnik v. Northwestern Packing Co., 335 Il1. App. 568, 82 N.E.2d 195 (1948) (abstract only);
Lush'us Brand Distribs., Inc. v. Fort Dearborn Lithograph Co., 330 Ill. App. 216, 70 N.E.2d 737
(1946).
206 10 Ill. 2d at 573-74, 141 N.E.2d at 50 (relying upon the interpretation of § 210 ofthe British
Companies Act in Elder v. Elder & Watson, 1952 Sess. Cas. 49, 55).
207 Id. at 576, 141 N.E.2d at 51.
208 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960).
209 Id. at 220, 170 N.E.2d at 138.
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established oppression entitling the plaintiffs to liquidation. Although
corporate dissolution was deemed to be a drastic remedy, "when oppres-
sion is positively shown, the oppressed are entitled to the protection of
the law." 210
After a slight detour in which an appellate court cautioned that
"[t]he ends ofjustice would not be served by too broad an application of
the statute, for that would merely eliminate one evil by substituting a
greater one-oppression of the majority by the minority," 21' there fol-
lowed a series of appellate court decisions decreeing dissolution based
upon a broad reading of what constitutes oppressive conduct. Conduct
which excludes a minority shareholder from participation in the enter-
prise or which can be characterized as heavy-handed or overbearing has
sufficed to warrant dissolution. For example, in Compton v. Paul K Har-
ding Realty Co., where the defendant was charged with managing the cor-
poration to the exclusion of the plaintiff and with withdrawing an
excessive salary, the court stated that "an arbitrary, overbearing and
heavy-handed course of conduct . . .justified] the finding of oppres-
sion. .. ,,2 In examining the record, the court stated: "Specific in-
stances of such evidence include testimony regarding the failure of
defendant Harding to call meetings of the board of directors or to con-
sult with plaintiff Compton regarding management of corporate affairs,
his imperious attitude when questioned about his salary and his dilatory
reaction to the plaintiffs' requests." 213
Misuse of corporate funds or assets has also led to a conclusion of
oppression. Thus, where the defendant has taken excessive salaries214 or
misused corporate assets,2 15 the courts have found oppressive conduct
justifying dissolution. And, in a case in which an accounting was sought,
the court indicated that the failure "to pay dividends to minority stock-
holders, due to large salaries drawn by officer-majority stockholders"
could constitute oppressive conduct.2 16
2. Other Jurisdictions
Following, at least in part, the lead of Illinois, several other jurisdic-
tions have adopted an expansive definition of oppression. In White v.
Perkins, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that "[o]ppression as a
[statutory] ground for corporate dissolution... first occurred in Illinois
in 1933... [and] [b]y 1965 at least eleven other states, including Virginia
210 I at 221, 170 N.E.2d at 138.
211 Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Il. App. 2d 29, 36, 184 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1962)
(involving an unprofitable real estate complex; the court shrugged off plaintiff's allegations by citing
Wheeler, discussed supra note 27 and accompanying text).
212 6 111. App. 3d 488, 499, 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (1972). See also Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 111.
App. 3d 294, 405 N.E.2d 839 (1980). Cf Liddell v. Smith, 65 Il1. App. 2d 352, 213 N.E.2d 604
(1965) (court did not specify what facts led to conclusion of oppression; simply recited the facts at
length).
213 6 I11. App. 3d at 499, 285 N.E.2d at 581.
214 Cf id. at 496, 285 N.E.2d at 579. "
215 Ross v. 311 North Central Ave. Bldg. Corp., 130 I1. App. 2d 336, 264 N.E.2d 406 (1970). Cf
65 Ill. App. 2d at 357-58, 213 N.E.2d at 606.
216 Gray v. Hall, 10 111. App. 3d 1030, 1034, 295 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1973) (the court also indicated
that withholding dividends to freeze-out a minority shareholder could be oppressive).
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had adopted similar statutes. '2 17 In Perkins, White, the majority share-
holder in a bulk oil distributorship, refused to lease a service station to
the corporation as the parties had agreed or to declare dividends. Per-
kins, the minority shareholder, who was the only full-time employee of
the profitable business, was thus paying taxes on income he did not actu-
ally receive. White also began using corporate funds for the benefit of
his service station. When Perkins objected and filed suit, White termi-
nated him. Citing Central Standard Life Insurance and Gidwitz, the court
stated:
The word 'oppressive,' as used in the statute does not carry an essen-
tial inference of imminent disaster; it can contemplate a continuing
course of conduct. The word does not necessarily savor of fraud, and
the absence of 'mismanagement, or misapplication of assets,' does not
prevent a finding that the conduct of the dominant directors or officers
has been oppressive. It is not synonymous with 'illegal' and
'fraudulent. 218
As did the Illinois court in Central Standard Life Insurance, the Virginia
court agreed with the English case of Elder v. Elder & Watson, Ltd., defin-
ing oppression as "a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing,
and a violation of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his
money to a company is entitled to rely." 219 Quoting from another Com-
monwealth case, the court stated that oppression also means "a lack of
probity and fair dealing in the affairs of a company to the prejudice of
some of its members." 220
Relying upon the foregoing principles and authorities, the court up-
held the trial court's determination that White's conduct was oppressive.
However, it overturned the chancellor's order directing a dividend and
granting severance pay to Perkins on the basis that the "alternatives pro-
vided . . . [in the statute-dissolution or custodian] are exclusive rather
than inclusive." 221
The following year, the Oregon Supreme Court, in Baker v. Commer-
cial Body Builders, Inc., relied on similar authority and adopted the same
rhetoric in defining oppression but added the gloss that oppression and
breach of fiduciary duty are closely related concepts:
Thus, an abuse of corporate position for private gain at the expense of
the stockholders is 'oppressive' conduct. Or the plundering of a
'close' corporation by the siphoning off of profits by excessive salaries
or bonus payments and the operation of the business for the sole ben-
efit of the majority of the stockholders, to the detriment of the minor-
ity stockholders, would constitute such 'oppressive' conduct as to
authorize a dissolution of the corporation under the terms of ORS
57.595.222
217 213 Va. 129, 134, 189 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1972) (citations omitted).
218 Id. (citing Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill. 2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1956); Gid-
witz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960)).
219 213 Va. at 134, 189 S.E.2d at 320 (quoting Elder v. Elder & Watson, Ltd., 1952 Sess. Cas. 49,
55).
220 Id. (quoting Scottish Co-op Wholesale Soc'y v. Meyer, 3 All E.R. 66, 86 (1958)).
221 Id. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320.
222 264 Or. 614, 629, 507 P.2d 387, 394 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
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On the other hand, the court cautioned that the oppressive conduct
must be "extremely serious" 223 -or that the oppressors must be "incorri-
gible" 224 before dissolution is warranted. "[V]ague apprehensions" 225
of future mischief will not suffice. While the-plaintiff's employment had
been terminated, business had been bad, he. had worked only part time
for the corporation, he had not been productive, and he had been offered
about fifty percent more for his shares than he had paid three years ear-
lier. While some of the defendant's acts could be deemed oppressive,
the Baker court did not view them as serious enough to warrant
dissolution.
However, the Baker decision is most notable for its gratuitous listing
of ten alternative actions a court may take rather than dissolve a corpora-
tion where the conduct of those in control is oppressive. 226 As will be
discussed in the next'section, the development of alternatives to dissolu-
tion has freed courts to broaden the scope of what constitutes oppressive
conduct, particularly by adopting a reasonable expectations test.227 The
Baker decision may have foreshadowed the premise that less drastic rem-
edies may be justified by less oppressive conduct than that required to
dissolve a corporation.
While the abstract formulations of what constitutes oppressive con-
duct appeared favorable to minority shareholders, such shareholders had
difficulty in the 1970s obtaining relief in jurisdictions other than Illinois.
In Fix v. Fix Material Co., Inc. ,228 a Missouri court said all the right things,
citing Perkins, Baker, and the Illinois decisions and adding that "the law
imposes equitable limitations on the rights of dominant shareholders to
act in their own self-interest," 229 but then declined to grant relief.
In Fix, the plaintiff was a forty-one percent shareholder and the
widow of one of two brothers who had controlled the company. In the
ten years following her husband's death, no dividends were paid, the
other brother and his son received both salaries and occasional bonuses
while assets were being sold to generate cash, and the book value of the
company had dropped about ten percent. The court, while recognizing
the "position of frustration and corporate impotence [in] which minority
shareholders sometimes find themselves, ' 23 0 denied relief but stated that
the combination of facts "comes narrowly close to a level of oppressive
or illegal conduct within the meaning of the statute." 23 1
The court did, however, send a message to those in control by stat-
ing that "[i]f the conditions continue in the direction described, a future
223 Id. at 630, 507 P.2d at 394.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 631-33, 507 P.2d at 395-96. 'See infra notes 259-70 and accompanying text. Since the
court did not find such oppression as might justify dissolution, there was no need to find an alterna-
tive to dissolution.
227 See infra text following note 271.
228 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
229 Id. at 358.
230 Id. at 361.
231 Id.
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action by those aggrieved might well produce a different result. '232 The
court did not suggest where the "aggrieved" party would obtain the
funds to bring another action, an important omission in light of the
court's recognition that the "plaintiff received no return or benefit from
her investment in any form." 233 The decision here should be contrasted
with that of the New York court ten years later where, on what would
appear to be less egregious facts, the widow was awarded relief.23 4 The
Fix court, which recognized the ten alternatives to dissolution suggested
by Baker,2 35 could have retained jurisdiction to liquidate the corporation
"[i]f the conditions [did] continue in the direction described. s236
Finally, in 1979, a New Jersey court, in Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Re-
alty Co., after reviewing the foregoing authority, concluded that, "[w]hile
the terminology employed by both the statute and case law certainly pro-
vides the court with the latitude necessary to deal with all the circum-
stances peculiar to any case brought to its attention, it fails to suggest any
perspective from which to judge what is oppressive or unfair." 237 The
Exadaktilos court critically reviewed the differences between publicly held
corporations and close corporations and concluded that "[t]he special
circumstances, arrangements and personal relationships that frequently
underly the formation of close corporations generate certain expecta-
tions among the shareholders concerning their respective roles in corpo-
rate affairs, including management and earnings." 238
The task, then, for the court is to determine what understandings
initially characterized the relationship. As is often the case, the under-
standings of the parties were not incorporated in any written agreement.
The court was therefore required to review the evidence chronicling the
history of their relationship. The plaintiff held twenty percent of the
shares and was the son-in-law of a forty-percent holder. Two other
shareholders each held twenty percent and the father-in-law brought the
plaintiff into the business over their objection. The son-in-law failed to
get along with the other employees, quit on more than one occasion, and
generally performed unsatisfactorily. In concluding that his termination
was not oppressive, the court stated: "The promise of employment was
honored, the opportunity being lost to plaintiff through no fault of de-
fendants. The parties' expectation that plaintiff would at some time par-
ticipate in management was likewise thwarted by plaintiff's failure to
satisfy the condition precedent to participation, i.e., that he learn the
business." 23 9 The court evidenced some concern for his lack of return
on investment but left that issue for another day. Once again, this deci-
232 Id.
233 Id. at 356.
234 In re Mintz, 113 A.D.2d 803, 493 N.Y.S.2d 488 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
235 One of the alternatives suggested by Baker was to retain jurisdiction. See infra note 262.
236 538 S.W.2d at 361. In Handlan v. Handlan, 360 Mo. 1150, 232 S.W.2d 944 (1950), the court
(i) ordered liquidation of one corporation in six months unless the two brothers reached agreement
to break the deadlock and (ii) continued another corporation in receivership until the oppressive
conduct was terminated.
237 167 N.J. Super. 141, 152, 400 A.2d 554, 560 (1979).
238 Id. at 154, 400 A.2d at 561.
239 Id. at 156, 400 A.2d at 562.
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sion should be contrasted with the development of the law of oppression
in New York.240
While the plaintiff did not prevail in Exadaktilos, four years later a
terminated employee did prevail-even though his termination accorded
with good business judgment. While there may have been a basis to
terminate him, he performed his duties "creditably and conscientiously"
and thus, his "lack of effectiveness was not due to misconduct." 241 While
this fact may rationalize the different result, the other significant factor
was that the court in Hughes was considering oppression in light of an
alternative remedy, a judicial buy-out, and not dissolution. The signifi-
cance of alternative remedies will be addressed in the next section.
V. Alternative Remedies and the Evolution of Oppression Into
Reasonable Expectations
While the New Jersey court in Exadaktilos introduced the notion of
expectations as a standard by which to measure whether the challenged
conduct was oppressive, the reasonable expectations test reached full
bloom in New York after the legislature, in 1979, provided for a buy-out
of the minority shareholder as an alternative to dissolution when the mi-
nority alleged oppressive conduct by those in control. 242 Many of the
jurisdictions which have given a broad gloss to the definition of oppres-
sion in the 1980s also recognize alternative remedies, particularly judi-
cially supervised buy-outs, to dissolving a corporation when oppression
is found. Thus, the expansion of the concept of oppression is inextrica-
bly linked to the recognition and adoption of alternative -remedies to
dissolution.
A. The Development of Alternative Remedies
The concept of alternative remedies to dissolution is not new. In
1941, California broadened its grounds for involuntary dissolution by
adding a provision that would permit liquidation when it was "reasonably
necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of any substantial
number of the shareholders, or of the complaining shareholders. ' 243
Professor Ballantine had been vocal in his opposition to dissolution at
the behest of minority shareholders. This "make[s] it too easy for an
obstreperous minority to interfere with the legitimate control and man-
agement of the majority by creating a cash nuisance value. ' 244 To "as-
sure fairness to minority shareholders and at the same time to lessen the
danger of minority abuse, ' 245 the legislature also enacted, in 1941, a
provision providing for a buy-out of the complaining shareholder by the
240 See Gimpel v. Bolstein, 125 Misc. 2d 45, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (family
member who was fired for theft was nonetheless entitled to a return on his investment) (discussed
infra note 279 and accompanying text).
241 Hughes v. Sego Int'l, Ltd., 192 N.J. Super. 60, 65, 469 A.2d 74, 77 (1983).
242 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 1104-a, 1118 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988).
243 1941 Cal. Stat. 2057-58 (codified as amended at CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (West 1977)).
244 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAws 256 (1933 Supp.).
245 Stumpfv. C.E. Stumpf Sons, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674 (1975).
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majority if the majority so elected. 246 If the parties could not agree on
price, the court would determine the fair cash value of the shares.
However, even though the courts were decrying dissolution as a
drastic remedy, there was no rush by legislatures to provide alternative
remedies, at least in the form of a buy-out option, until the 1970s. 247 At
least seven states enacted buy-out provisions in the 1970s 248 and at least
three additional states enacted such provisions in the 1980s.249 The stat-
utory schemes range from simple to detailed and from a focus solely
upon buy-outs to a multi-remedy approach.
The simplest, and most typical, 250 pattern is that of Michigan which
provides:
Sec. 825. (1) The circuit court of the county in which the regis-
tered office of the corporation is located may adjudge the dissolution
of, and liquidate the assets and business of, a corporation, in an action
filed by a shareholder when it is established that the acts of the direc-
tors or those in control of the corporation are illegal, fraudulent or
willfully unfair and oppressive to the corporation or to such
shareholder.
(2) In an action filed by a shareholder to dissolve the corporation
on a ground enumerated in subsection (1), the circuit court upon es-
tablishment of such ground may make such order or grant such relief,
other than dissolution, as it deems appropriate, including, without lim-
itation, an order providing for any of the followirig:
(a) Cancellation or alteration of a provision contained in the
articles of incorporation, or an amendment thereof, or in the by-
laws of the corporation.
(b) Cancellation, alteration or injunction against a resolution
or other act of the corporation.
(c) Direction or prohibition of an act of the corporation or of
shareholders, directors, officers or other persons party to the
action.
(d) Purchase at their fair value of shares of a shareholder,
either by the corporation or by the officers, directors or other
shareholders responsible for the wrongful acts. 2 5 1
246 1941 Cal. Stat. 2058-59 (codified as amended at CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West 1977 & Supp.
1989)).
247 Rhode Island did adopt a buy-out provision in 1969. 1969 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 141, § I (codi-
fied at R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-90.1 (1985)).
248 See Maine, 1971 Me. Laws 756 ch. 439, § 1 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 1123
(1981)); Maryland, 1975 Md. Laws 1679 ch. 311, § 2 (codified at MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.
§ 4-603 (1985)); Michigan, 1972 Mich. Pub. Acts 847 no. 284, § 825 (codified at MICH. ComP. LAws
ANN. § 450.1825(2) (West 1973)); New Jersey, 1973 NJ. Laws 1036 ch. 366, § 67 (codified at N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West 1978)); New York, 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 217, § 3 (codified at N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 1118 (McKinney 1980)); North Carolina, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 ch. 469, § 41 (codi-
fied at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1 (1979)); West Virginia, 1974 W. Va. Acts 290 ch. 13 (codified at
W. VA. CODE § 31-1-134 (1988)).
249 See Illinois, 1983 Ill. Laws 7019-20 Art. 12, § 12.55 (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para.
12.55 (Smith-Hurd 1985)); Minnesota, 1981 Minn. Laws ch. 270, § 108 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.751 (West 1985)); South Carolina, 1981 S.C. Acts 626 No. 146, § 2 (codified at S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-21-155 (Law. Co-op. 1987)).
250 See also Maine, North Carolina, and South Carolina, supra notes 248-49 (Maine also provides
for a provisional director).
251 MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 450.1825 (West 1973) (repealed 1989).
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The standard is broad: that which the court "deems appropriate." In
addition, in Michigan, the court may order the purchase on its own mo-
tion while in other jurisdictions, a petition or election is necessary, either
by the corporation, 252 or the other shareholders, 253 or.the complaining
shareholder. 254 The statutes uniformly establish that the purchase price
shall be "fair value," not "fair market value." 255 New Jersey recognizes
that there may need to be "adjustments deemed equitable" in establish-
ing the price because of the oppressive conduct,25 6 while Minnesota
would use the price established in a shareholder agreement,257 unless it
is unreasonable-as is so often the case.2 58
Complementing these statutes are decisions in several jurisdictions
in which the courts have recognized that the general equitable powers of
a court suffice to order a remedy other than dissolution when the
grounds for dissolution exist. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc. 259 is
frequently cited for this proposition. In Baker, the Oregon Supreme
Court, after reviewing the approach of other jurisdictions in defining op-
pressive conduct, adopted a broad approach and analogized oppressive
conduct to that which would be a breach of the fiduciary duty of the ma-
jority of "good faith and fair dealing" 260 owed to the minority. The
court, however, stated that "the remedy of a forced dissolution... may
equally be 'oppressive' to the majority stockholders" 261 and set forth ten
alternative remedies that might be appropriate. 262 While the Baker court
252 See California, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, NewJersey, and Rhode Island, supra notes 247-
49.
253 See Connecticut, West Virginia, and jurisdictions noted supra note-252.
254 See Illinois and Minnesota, supra note 249.
255 The significance of this terminology is discussed infra notes 352-54 and accompanying text
and notes 373-75 and accompanying text.
256 N.J. STAT ANN. § 14A: 12-7(8)(a) (West Supp. 1989).
257 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (subd. 2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1989).
258 See, e.g., In re Pace Photographers, Ltd., 71 N.Y.2d 737, 525 N.E.2d 713, 530 N.Y.S.2d 67
(1988) (Agreement provided for a stated value which had not been updated for four years and then
applied a 50% discount to the stated value. Book value is often used in such agreements, and, if
book value bears any relation to the value of the business, it is fortuitous.).
259 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973).
260 Id at 629, 507 P.2d at 394.
261 Id. at 630, 507 P.2d at 394.
262 Id. at 632-33, 507 P.2d at 395-96. The remedies listed are the following:
(a) The entry of an order requiring dissolution of the corporation at a specified future date,
to become effective only in the event that the stockholders fail to resolve their differences
prior to that date;
(b) The appointment of a receiver, not for the purposes of dissolution,. but to continue the
operation of the corporation for the benefit of all the stockholders, both majority and mi-
nority, until differences are resolved or 'oppressive' conduct ceases;
(c) The appointment of a 'special fiscal agent' to report to the court relating to the contin-
ued operation of the corporation, as a protection to its minority stockholders, and the re-
tention ofjurisdiction of the case by the court for that purpose;
(d) The retention ofjurisdiction of the case by the court for the protection of the minority
stockholders without appointment of a receiver or 'special fiscal agent';
(e) The ordering of an accounting by the majority in control of the corporation for funds
alleged to have been misappropriated;
(0 The issuance of an injunction to prohibit continuing acts of 'oppressive' conduct and
which may include the reduction of salaries or bonus payments found to be unjustified or
excessive;
(g) The orderiuig of affirmative relief by the required declaration of a dividend or a reduc-
tion and distribution of capital; "
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declined to grant the plaintiff any relief, four years later the Oregon
court granted a buy-out.2 63
The focus of alternative relief typically has been upon buy-outs of
minority shareholders. 264 An Iowa court, in upholding a buy-out of the
plaintiffs' shares, noted that the Iowa statute authorizing dissolution for
oppressive conduct and waste of corporate assets was comparable to the
Oregon statute pursuant to which alternative remedies could be granted
according to the Baker court. The Iowa court accordingly concluded that
the Iowa statute, though silent on remedies other than dissolution, "al-
lows the district court to fashion other equitable relief."265
Since the Oregon statute is based upon the Illinois Act and the
Model Act,2 66 which in turn are the bases for most of the oppression
statutes, 267 the logic of the Iowa court would mean that alternative relief,
particularly buy-outs of minority shareholders, is available in most, if not
all, jurisdictions. In this vein, the Supreme Court of West Virginia has
stated that "most courts have concluded that because of the drastic con-
sequences of dissolution, less drastic alternatives should be fashioned if
possible." 268 Similarly, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that a
"trial court abused its discretion in ordering the extreme remedy of dis-
solution" 269 and instructed the trial court to require either the corpora-
tion or the majority shareholder to purchase plaintiff's shares "at a price
determined by the court to be the fair value thereof."' 270 Accordingly, it
cannot be gainsaid that minority shareholder buy-outs are firmly estab-
lished throughout the states as alternative relief to dissolution when such
shareholders have been subject to oppressive actions by those in control.
The availability of alternative remedies, in turn, has had a substantial im-
pact on the recognition of reasonable expectations as the basis for deter-
mining whether oppressive conduct exists.
(h) The ordering of affirmative relief by the entry of an order requiring the corporation or
a majority of its stockholders to purchase the stock of the minority stockholders at a price to
be determined according to a specified formula or at a price determined by the court to be a
fair and reasonable price;
(i) The ordering of affirmative relief by the entry of an order permittin'g minority stock-
holders to purchase additional stock under conditions specified by the court;
(j) An award of damages to minority stockholders as compensation for any injury suffered
by them as the result of 'oppressive' conduct by the majority in control of the corporation.
Id. (footnotes omitted.) See also Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
263 Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 278 Or. 305, 564 P.2d 277 (1977).
264 Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980) (after remand, finding of oppres-
sion and order of buy-out), aff'dsub nom. Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985); Maddox v.
Norman, 206 Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230 (1983); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 104 N.M. 523,
724 P.2d 232 (Ct. App. 1986); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987); Delaney v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., 278 Or. 305, 564 P.2d 277 (1977); Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988).
265 Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269, 275 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).
266 See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
267 See, e.g., Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 356-57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
268 Masinter v. Webco Co., 164 W. Va. 241, 249, 262 S.E.2d 433, 439 (1980).
269 Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 389 (N.D. 1987).
270 Id.
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B. Reasonable Expectations-The New, York Decisions
While Illinois earlier led the way in specifying what conduct can be
deemed oppressive,271 since 1980 New York has played the dominant
role by developing the reasonable expectations test to define oppressive
conduct. A year after the New York legislature enacted the statutory
scheme embodying oppression as a ground for dissolution but permit-
ting the corporation or the other shareholders to avoid dissolution by
electing to purchase the petitioner's shares, the first significant suit, In Re
Topper,272 was brought. Topper had worked for twenty-five years for a
company in Florida when he left to become a one-third shareholder in
two pharmacies in New York. In addition to uprooting himself and his
family, he invested his life savings in the ventures and executed personal
guarantees. He first received a salary of $30,000 which was later raised
to $75,000. Then, within one year of the organization of the two corpo-
rations, his employment was terminated. The court, in finding oppres-
sion and interpreting defendants' affidavits as an election to buy out the
plaintiff, stated:
Whether the controlling shareholders discharged petitioner for cause
or in their good business judgment is irrelevant. The Court finds that
the undisputed understanding of the parties was such at the time of
the formation of the corporations that the respondents' actions have
severely damaged petitioner's reasonable expectations and constitute
a freeze-out of petitioner's interest; consequently, they are deemed to
be 'oppressive' within the statutory framework. 273
This approach stands in marked contrast, not only to the business
judgment rule, but also to the shareholder fiduciary duty rule-at least in
those situations in which a court would, in effect, permit a "business pur-
pose" defense to a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. For example, even
Wilkes recognized that conduct that appears to be a breach of duty can be
justified by a business purpose.274 The difference in result may be ratio-
nalized by the difference in focus and the difference in remedy. In deter-
mining whether there has been a breach of fiduciary duty, the focus is
upon wrongdoing by the person in control and the remedy is to invali-
date the transaction, either by enjoining it or by awarding damages. In
the reasonable expectations test, the focus is on the minority shareholder
and the remedy is not to undo a corporate transaction but to permit or
order another transaction-a buy-out of the minority shareholder. Thus,
the crux is not identifying a traditional wrong but rather identifying the
basis of the bargain-what were the explicit or implicit conditions pursu-
ant to. which the parties associated themselves together in the corporate
form. The court recognized that these conditions or expectations are not
likely to be in written form:
271 See supra notes 198-216 and accompanying text.
272 107 Misc. 2d 25, 443 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Stip. Ct. 1980).
273 Id. at 28, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
274 Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 851, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (1976).
See also supra notes 79-107 and accompanying text.
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This Court, too, recognizes that in a close corporation the bargain of
the participants is often not reflected in the corporation's charter, by-
laws nor even in separate signed agreements. The parties' full under-
standing may not even be in writing but may have to be construed
from their actions. Unlike their counterparts in large corporations,
minority shareholders in small corporations often expect to participate
in management and operations. 'Furthermore, there generally is an
expectation on the part of some participants that their interest is to be
recognized in the form of a salary derived from employment with the
corporation.' These reasonable expectations constitute the bargain of
the parties in light of which subsequent conduct must be appraised.2 75
This approach has become the touchstone for evaluating oppressive con-
duct in the 1980s.
The following year, the New York court again faced an egregious
situation in which the minority shareholders, in a chain of retail film
processing stores, had failed to protect themselves. 27 6 The plaintiff al-
leged that a son from each family was to be an operating employee with
the three fathers in supervisory capacities. The plaintiff further alleged
that his son was the moving force behind the creation of the business and
that both he and his son had relocated to New York to participate in the
business. Within a year, the other principals removed the plaintiff and
his son as officers and employees and offered the plaintiff $ 10,000 for his
shares. Parenthetically, in a later opinion, the court valued the plaintiff's
interest at $452,000.277 The court held that "the actions of the majority
in eliminating the petitioner and his son from the active operation of the
Corporation in which they had participated, and in which they had every
reasonable expectation of being able to continue to participate, consti-
tutes 'oppressive' conduct." 2 78
The next significant New York case, Gimpel v. Bolstein,2 79 involved
two unique twists: the plaintiff had been terminated for embezzlement
and the plaintiff was a third-generation owner. The court, in reviewing
the decisions on oppression, found two themes: the "reasonable expec-
tations" test, and the "conduct which fair-minded people would find ob-
jectionable" test. With respect to termination as defeating reasonable
expectations, the court stated:
Also, it must be recognized that 'reasonable expectations' do not run
only one way. To the extent that Robert may have entertained 'rea-
sonable expectations' of profit in 1975, the other shareholders also
entertained 'reasonable expectations' of fidelity and honesty from him.
275 107 Misc. 2d at 33-34, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365 (quoting Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co.,
167 N.J. Super. 141. 400 A.2d 554 (1979)) (citations omitted).
276 In re Gene Barry One Hour Photo Process, Inc., 111 Misc. 2d 559,444 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct.
1981). The court observed that "[t]he parties did not enter into any shareholders' or any other
written agreement with respect to the operation of the Corporation and many organizational formal-
ities, including adoption of by-laws, do not seem to have taken place prior to institution of this
proceeding." Id. at 560, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
277 Taines v. Gene Barry One Hour Photo Process, Inc., 123 Misc. 2d 529, 474 N.Y.S.2d 362
(Sup. Ct. 1983), aft'd, 108 A.D.2d 630,486 N.Y.S.2d 699 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 66 N.Y.2d 757,
488 N.E.2d 113, 497 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1985). See infra notes 307-09 and accompanying text.
278 111 Misc. 2d at 565, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
279 125 Misc. 2d 45, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
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All such expectations were shattered when Robert stole from the cor-
poration. His own acts broke all bargains. Since then, the only expec-
tations he could reasonably entertain were those of a discovered thief:
ostracism and prosecution. 280
The court went on to question whether the reasonable expectations ap-
proach is applicable when the existing shareholders are generations re-
moved from the founders. Nevertheless, even though there was no
problem with the termination and even if the reasonable expectations
test was not appropriate, the court found that the plaintiff was still enti-
tled to relief:
Even though Robert may not lay claim to the reasonable expectation
of any specific benefits, it does not necessarily follow that the majority
shareholders may treat him as shabbily as they please.... Although a
minority shareholder may be in the position of a stranger to them, the
majority must still act with 'probity and fair dealing,' and if their con-
duct becomes 'burdensome, harsh and wrongful,' they may be found
to have been guilty of oppression and the corporation may be subject
to dissolution.281
Accordingly, the court concluded that "the majority must make an elec-
tion: they must either alter the corporate financial structure so as to
commence payment of dividends, or else make a reasonable offer to buy
out Robert's interest." 282
With this background, the New York Court of Appeals in In re Kemp
& Beatley, Inc., 283 considered the petition of two former employees who
had forty-two and thirty-five years of service but who now were receiving
no compensation. The six other shareholders were apparently still em-
ployed by the company. In the past, defacto dividends based upon stock
ownership had been paid in the form of extra compensation bonuses.
After their employment was terminated, the extra compensation was still
paid but not based upon stock ownership.
The court of appeals clarified that the concept of oppressive con-
duct, under the statute, is distinct from illegality or fraud and that the
distinction has been resolved "by considering oppressive actions to refer
to conduct that substantially defeats the 'reasonable expectations' held
by minority shareholders in committing their capital to the particular en-
terprise." 28 4 Accordingly, the court held that "utilizing a complaining
280 Id. at 52, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1019-20 (citations omitted).
281 Id. at 53, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1020.
282 Id. at 56, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1022.
283 64 N.Y.2d 63, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1984).
284 Id. at 72, 473 N.E.2d at 1179, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 805. Before determining what reasonable
expectations might be, the court stated:
It is widely understood that, in addition to supplying capital to a contemplated or ongoing
enterprise and expecting a fair and equal return, parties comprising the ownership of a
close corporation may expect to be actively involved in its management and operation.
His [the shareholder in the close corporation] participation in that particular corpora-
tion is often his principal or sole source of income. As a matter of fact, providing employ-
ment for himself may have been the principal reason why he participated in organizing the
corporation. He may or may not anticipate an ultimate profit from the sale of his interest,
but he normally draws very little from the corporation as dividends. In his capacity as an
officer or employee of the corporation, he looks to his salary for the principal return on his
1990)
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
shareholder's 'reasonable expectations' as a means of identifying and
measuring conduct alleged to be oppressive is appropriate."' 285 The
court cautioned that expectations must be reasonable and objective 2816
and concluded that such was the case in the matter before it:
Kemp & Beatley had a long-standing policy of awarding defacto divi-
dends based on stock ownership in the form of 'extra compensation
bonuses.' . . . [T]here was uncontroverted proof that this policy was
changed either shortly before or shortly after petitioners' employment
ended. Extra compensation was still awarded by the company. The
only difference was that stock ownership was no longer a basis for the
payments. 287
What the New York decisions make clear is that those in control of a
corporation may no longer use the business judgment rule to shield from
judicial scrutiny actions that are detrimental to minority shareholders.
The courts have recognized the reality that compensation paid to those
in control has a two fold function: to recompense services and to provide
a return on investment. To deny a minority shareholder employment
when ajob was part of his rationale in investing 288 is oppressive, as is the
failure to pay dividends to nonemployee shareholders when employed
shareholders are receiving defacto dividends through salaries.
While a reasonable expectations test may appear as elusive to apply
as oppression, it does provide a focus from which to evaluate a situation.
That people often invest in a closely held corporation to provide ajob is
almost self-evident; if there is doubt, the proposition can be confirmed
empirically by surveying representative businesses.
C. The Development of the Reasonable Expectations Test in Other Jurisdictions
The reasonable expectations test, as developed by the New York
courts, has had a substantial impact upon the recognition of minority
shareholder rights. Kemp & Beatley, of course, has been followed in sub-
sequent New York decisions. 289 But it also has strongly influenced the
capital investment, because earnings of a close corporation, as is well known, are distrib-
uted in major part in salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits.
Id. at 71, 473 N.E.2d at 1178, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 804 (quoting F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS 21-22
(2d ed. 1971)).
285 Id. at 73, 473 N.E.2d at 1179, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
286 The court stated:
Majority conduct should not be deemed oppressive simply because the petitioner's subjec-
tive hopes and desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled. Disappointment alone should
not necessarily be equated with oppression.
Rather, oppression should be deemed to arise only when the majority conduct substan-
tially defeats expectations that, objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circum-
stances and were central to the petitioner's decision to join the venture.
Id.
287 Id. at 74, 473 N.E.2d at 1180, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
288 The New York courts have recognized that a passive investor in a real estate corporation has
no stake in employment. See In re Farega Realty Corp., 132 A.D.2d 797, 517 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1987).
See also In re Brach, 135 A.D.2d 711, 522 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1987).
289 See, e.g., In re Rambusch, 143 A.D.2d 605, 533 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1988) (error to dismiss petition
of 30% shareholder who was dismissed after 36 years); In re Burack, 137 A.D.2d 523, 524 N.Y.S.2d
457 (1988) (termination of shareholder employed for 40 years was oppressive and justified buy-out);
In re Imperatore, 128 A.D.2d 707, 512 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1987) (while minority shareholder's salary
could have been reduced for poor performance, it was oppressive to fire him); In re Mintz, 113
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highest courts of North Dakota and Alaska to adopt a reasonable expec-
tations test to measure oppressive conduct. The North Dakota Supreme
Court, after holding that a freeze-out of a thirty-percent shareholder by
terminating his employment defeated his reasonable expectations and
was therefore oppressive, reversed the order of dissolution and in-
structed the trial court to frame a buy-out remedy.290 The Alaska
Supreme Court, in upholding the trial court's finding of oppressiveness
and ordering of a buy-out, stated that what constitutes oppressive con-
duct can be difficult to discern; it noted that it favored the reasonable
expectations test embodied in Kemp & Beatley.291 Both cases coupled a
reasonable expectations approach with a recognition ofjudicial power to
fashion alternative remedies to dissolution.
Prior to Kemp & Beatley, but relying upon Topper and Exadaktilos, the
Montana Supreme Court adopted a reasonable expectations approach in
finding that a brother, who was a twenty-five to fifty-percent shareholder
in three related family owned corporations, had been oppressed when
the corporations were so operated as to deny any benefit to him.2 92 Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in interpreting a North Car-
olina statute which permitted dissolution when "reasonably necessary for
the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining share-
holder," 293 relied upon Topper and Gidwitz2 94 in adopting a reasonable
expectations approach. 295 Meiselman v. Meiselman, however, offered a new
insight in applying the reasonable expectations test, one that it believed
was dictated by the state's unique statute. The statutory focus was upon
protecting the rights and interests of the shareholder rather than upon
oppression. The trial court had dismissed the suit, finding no wrongdo-
ing or breach of duty by the defendant. The supreme court reversed and
instructed the trial court to determine what were plaintiff's " 'rights or
interests'-his 'reasonable expectations.' "296 The court should then de-
termine whether they needed protection and, if so, what form of relief,
including statutory alternatives to dissolution, was appropriate.
Two other jurisdictions, New Mexico and Texas, have reviewed the
case law defining oppression and have concluded that it is "an expansive
term that is used to cover a multitude of situations dealing with improper
conduct." 297 While not explicitly adopting a reasonable expectations
test, the courts of both states opined that the absence of a rigidly defined
A.D.2d 803,493 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1985) (error to dismiss petition alleging family of retired shareholder
received no dividends for 12 years while other shareholders received salaries); In re Wiedy's Furni-
ture Clearance Center Co., 108 A.D.2d 81,487 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1985) (oppression where son, who left
another position to join family business, was terminated 10 years later).
290 Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987).
291 Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985). The parties were previously before the
court in Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980), where they suggested that the
plaintiff could force a buy-out of her shares if she could establish oppression or waste.
292 Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 20, 645 P.2d 929 (1982).
293 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982).
294 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
295 Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
296 Id. at 306, 307 S.E.2d at 567.
297 McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 104 N.M. 523, 527, 724 P.2d 232, 236 (1986); Davis
v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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standard for oppressive conduct enabled courts to determine, on a case-
by-case basis, "whether the acts complained of serve to frustrate the legit-
imate expectations of minority shareholders.- 298 In connection with their
findings of oppression, both courts also held that there is general equita-
ble power to fashion remedies as alternatives to dissolution when op-
pression is found.
Several other cases also point to a broadening of protection for mi-
nority shareholders. A Maryland court recently clarified an earlier deci-
sion and held that self-dealing transactions could constitute
oppression,299 and two other jurisdictions, Louisiana and Minnesota, in-
terpreted their unique statutory provisions for dissolution in a broad
manner. In Gooding v. Millet,300 a one-third shareholder charged that an-
other shareholder operated the corporation, which had never declared
dividends, as his alter ego and thus the corporation had been guilty of
"gross and persistent ultra vires acts."30 1 The situation was somewhat
akin to the conduct found oppressive in Gidwitz; the Louisiana court
found that such conduct warranted dissolution since the legislature in-
tended that a broad application be given to the statute. Finally, in
Sheehan v. Mondati (In re Villa Maria, Inc.),302 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the action of a fifty percent shareholder in running the
business as he pleased and failing to pay dividends, thus depriving the
other shareholder of any return on investment, was an abuse of authority
under the Minnesota dissolution statute. 303
The foregoing perspective demonstrates that courts in this decade
have almost uniformly30 4 taken a broad approach to defining oppressive
conduct, and where alternatives to dissolution do not exist by statute,
have upheld the general equitable power of the courts to fashion such
alternatives. The pattern appears firmly established.
The most common form of alternative remedy is the buy-out of the
minority shareholder. But such a remedy can only be meaningful if the
price is fair and realistic. Since the parties will often differ markedly on
what is a fair and realistic price, courts will need to confront valuation
298 104 N.M. at 527, 724 P.2d at 236 (emphasis added); 754 S.W.2d at 381 (emphasis added).
299 Valerino v. Little, 62 Md. App. 588, 490 A.2d 756 (1985) (clarifying Lynch v. Buchanan, 37
Md. App. 413, 377 A.2d 592 (1977)).
300 430 So. 2d 742 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
301 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:143-A(7) (West 1969).
302 312 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1981).
303 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.49 (West 1980) (repealed by 1981 Minn. Laws ch. 270, Ann.
§ 302A.751 (West. 1985 & Supp. 1989)).
304 Two courts have taken a very restrictive view of what constitutes oppression. In Iwasaki v.
Iwasaki Bros., Inc., 58 Or. App. 543, 649 P.2d 598 (1982), two brothers terminated the third and
refused to pay dividends even though he was taxed on the undistributed income because of the
corporation's subchapter S election. Income before salaries for the other two brothers had been
averaging almost $200,000 a year. The court found that the salary payments and the policy of not
paying dividends were protected by the business judgment rule. In Capitol Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin,
381 So. 2d 1038 (Miss. 1980), the general manager, 25% shareholder of a dealership, was termi-
nated by the new majority owners. The court found that his "reasonable expectations have been
thwarted, but not grossly so." Id. at 1039. The court justified his termination on the basis that
profits were higher under the new owners than under his management for the old owners. The
court failed to understand that earnings were lower in the past because the old owners took large
salaries and bonuses and charged the expenses of a yacht to the dealership. See infra note 335.
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theory and issues in implementing buy-out relief. Accordingly, the bal-
ance of this Article will focus upon the valuation process.
VI. Valuation of Minority Interests in Judicial Buy-Outs
There is no question but that the development of a buy-out remedy
for minority shareholders who are confronted with actions by those in
control that are oppressive or that defeat the reasonable expectations of
the minority is a very positive development. The efficacy of such a rem-
edy, however, is inextricably intertwined with the valuation process. In-
variably, the parties are far apart in their respective views of the value of
the business. 305 Often the "experts" are equally far apart.306 Prior to
trial, in one well known case, the majority offered the minority share-
holder $10,000; at the hearing, defendants' expert opined the business
was worth $71,000 and plaintiff's expert opined $20.7 million.30 7 The
court characterized their testimony as absurd308 and determined the
value of the corporation to be $1,356,000.309 When experts can have
such widely differing opinions, it is critical that the courts be vigilant to
protect the interests of minority shareholders.
Valuation theory is essentially conservative. This is in large measure
due to the fact that it has been tax driven. Most of the cases and articles
in the field are generated by the taxing process.310 If a conservative ap-
proach is not taken, the taxing process can become confiscatory. For ex-
ample, if the tax rate is 50% and the corporation is erroneously valued at
$1 million, the tax would be $500,000. However, if the corporation
could only be sold for $500,000, the taxing process would appropriate
the full value of the property.
The assessment of a tax contemporaneously creates a need for li-
quidity in order that funds be available to pay the tax. In the case of a
closely held corporation, if the shares are the primary asset and must be
liquidated to pay the taxes, the overstatement of value, as compared to
funds generated when the shares are sold, can result in a transfer of the
entire value of the shares to the government. Accordingly, both public
policy and equity dictate a conservative valuation process.
305 See supra note 22.
306 See, e.g., Hickory Creek Nursery, Inc. v.Johnston, 167 Ill. App. 3d 449, 521 N.E.2d 236 (1988)
(where one expert valued plaintiff's interest at $150,000 and the other expert valued it at zero).
307 In re Gene Barry One Hour Photo Process, Inc., 111 Misc. 2d 559, 560,444 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
308 Taines v. Gene Barry One Hour Photo Process, Inc., 123 Misc. 2d 529, 532, 474 N.Y.S.2d
362, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
309 Id at 537, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 368 (the court treated each of three shareholders as having lent the
corporation $215,000; plaintiff's one-third of $1,356,000 was $452,000, including the $215,000
"loan").
310 See generally Haynsworth, Valuation of Business Interests, 33 MERCER L. REv. 457 (1982). The
author characterizes Revenue Ruling 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, as the "most complete statement of
the relevant factors to consider in valuing a closely held business." Id. at 466. His article is replete
with citations to tax cases and tax-oriented secondary materials. His discussion of discounts relies
almost exclusively on tax-oriented authority. Id. at 488-97. See also Smith, Valuation and the Minority
Discount, 42 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N ch. 52 (1984); Comment, Valuing Closely Held Stock: Control
PreMiums and Minority Discounts, 31 EMORY L.J. 139 (1982).
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On the other hand, what is at stake in the "oppression" cases is often
a job-a very attractive job. For example, in one recent, superficially
well-considered decision, a federal court ordered the "money" share-
holder to buy out the "work" shareholder. 311 At first glance, the deci-
sion appears sound: money has greater funds than work. And the value
assigned to work's shares-$844,174-was not insubstantial. What work
lost, however, was a job paying $250,000 per year. If he were to remain
in that position for ten more years, the present worth of his employment,
discounted at 8%, is $1,677,525.312 If one year later, work was able to
obtain another position at $100,000, the present value of that position
for nine more years would be $624,690. What work has lost is
$1,052,835. While he received $844,174, he needed to invade that prin-
cipal for a year's living expenses while he found the new position.3 13 The
situation becomes all the more disadvantageous to the minority share-
holder as the value of the shares decreases vis-a-vis the compensation he
has been receiving.
While valuation is not an "exact science,"3 14 as will be illustrated in
the next section of this Article dealing with valuation generally,31 5 that
part of valuation theory which most critically needs to be reconsidered is
the process of discounting minority interests. While such discounts
make sense in the tax setting, they are wholly inappropriate in a state
court proceeding in which a minority shareholder seeks to be bought out
because of oppressive conduct by the majority.
The impact of such discounts can be devastating to a minority share-
holder. For example, in Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, the appraiser for the
defendants applied a minority discount of twenty-eight percent and a li-
quidity or nonmarketability discount of forty percent.31 6 The net effect
of the two discounts was to devalue the minority shares by fifty-seven
percent. 31 7 The value of the shares determined by the court was
$302,000. Had the minority and liquidity discounts been applied, the
plaintiff would have received only $130,000. The court, however, found
that neither a minority nor illiquidity discount was proper and awarded
the plaintiff $302,000.
Accordingly, the primary thrust of the balance of this Article will be
to demonstrate that both minority and illiquidity discounts are inappro-
311 Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317 (D.S.C. 1987).
312 The present-value factor for a ten-year annuity is 6.7101; the factor for a nine-year annuity is
6.2469. Multiplying the factor by the salary calculates the present value of the salary. See S. PRATr,
VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES app. A-2 (1981).
313 In my experience, terminated executives seldom walk into comparable paying jobs the next
day. Were this not true, there would be no justification for the "golden parachutes" presently in
vogue.
314 See, e.g., Johnston v. Hickory Creek Nursery, Inc., 167 Ill. App. 3d 449, 454, 521 N.E.2d 236,
238 (1988), where the court stated: "It is well recognized that determination of the fair market value
of a closely-held corporation is not an exact science as witnessed by the frequency with which ap-
praisers differ in their opinions concerning the appropriate value to assign to a shareholder's interest
in these corporations."
315 See infra text accompanying notes 318-34.
316 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Nos. 7959, 7960, 7967, 7968 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1988) (LEXIS,
states library, Del file), aff'd, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
317 Fair value minus 28% equals 72% fair value. Seventy-two percent fair value minus 40%
equals 43% fair value.
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priate in valuing minority shares when the trigger for valuation is oppres-
sive or comparable conduct by those in control. Valuation in general,
the adjustments to income and assets necessary to offset the effects of the
oppressive conduct, and the effect of shareholder repurchase agreements
will also be briefly considered.
A. Valuation-A General Perspective
It has already been noted that valuation is an inexact science.31 8
While the Delaware block approach is" the approach most commonly
employed- either directly31 9 or indirectly320 - courts have recognized
various other approaches, including multiples of gross revenue,3 21 ad-
justments of an earlier price paid by those acquiring a majority inter-
est,3 22 and discounted cash flow. Delaware itself, in Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., has rejected the Delaware block approach "to the extent it excludes
other generally accepted techniques used in the financial community and
the courts."3 23 In so doing, the court accepted the discounted cash flow
method of valuing UOP's stock.
However, the Delaware block approach can be Used to demonstrate
just how inexact the valuation "science" is. In Piemonte v. New Boston Gar-
den Corp. ,324 the trial court, in arriving at a value of $75.27 a share, em-
ployed a Delaware block approach as follows:
Value Weight Result
Market Value: $ 26.50 X 10% = $ 2.65
Earnings Value: 52.60 X 40% = 21.04
Net Asset Value: 103.16 X 50% = 51.58
Total Value Per Share: $75.27325
The most obvious softness in the valuation process is in the weigh-
ing. For example, if the weights for market value and net asset value
were reversed, the value of the corporation would drop dramatically:
318 See supra note 314.
319 See In re Delaware Racing Ass'n., 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203 (1965); Sporborg v. City
Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121 (1956); Piemonte v. New Boston Garden
Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145 (1979).
320 See, e.g., Sarrouf v. New England Patriots Football Club, 397 Mass.'542, 492 N.E.2d 1122
(1986) (court upheld a valuation predicated upon net asset value but stated that the same result
could have been justified under a Delaware block approach in which earnings and market value are
given little weight). Anytime a court considers multiple factors and assigns a weight to each, the
court is, in effect, using a Delaware block approach.
321 See supra text preceding note 175.
322 See, e.g., Stewart v. DJ. Stewart & Co., 37 Ill. App. 3d 848, 346 N.E.2d 475 (1976), where the
court employed what might at first glance appear to be a variation of the Delaware block approach.
However, the starting point for the court was the amount that had been paid by a company that had
acquired 80% of D.J. Stewart & Co. 21 months earlier. In other words, the court took the price paid
in the acquisition as presumptively reflecting fair value at that point in time and then adjusted that
$600 figure by various ratios reflecting the improvement in sales, operating profit, net income, and
book value in the intervening 21 month period. The court thereby came up with a value of $660 per
share even though defendant's appraiser, using a conventional Delaware block 4pproach, testified
that the value was $195 per share.
323 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983).
324 377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145 (1979).
325 Id. at 722 n.3, 387 N.E.2d at 1148 n.3.
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Value Weight Result
Market Value: $ 26.50 x 50% = $13.25
Earnings Value: 52.60 X 40% = 21.04
Net Asset Value: 103.16 x 10% = 10.31
Total Value Per Share: $44.60
The drop from $75.27 a share to $44.60 is approximately 40%. This is
not to suggest that appraisers capriciously juggle weights, but part of the
discrepancy between the valuations by the experts of each party is tracea-
ble to the weighing process. For example, a caricature of the expert
opinions in Johnston v. Hickory Creek Nursery, Inc., would show one expert
assigning a 100% weight to earnings in arriving at a value of the corpora-
tion of $450,000 and the other assigning a 100% weight to assets in ar-
riving at a value of zero.3 26 A 20/40/40 weighing in Piemonte will change
the value from $75 per share to $68. And who can say with any degree of
certainty that the appropriate weight for market value is 10% and not 5%
or 20%?
In addition, each of the factors contains elements of softness. Nor-
mally, market value is fairly straightforward if there is a market. If there
is no market, the appraisers seek to reconstruct a market.3 27 If the mar-
ket is "thin," the question generally is how much weight to attach to mar-
ket value.3 28
On the other hand, there is substantial softness in the earnings value
approach or its "cousin," discounted cash flow. The earnings value is
generally a product of earnings times the price/earnings ratio or "P/E"
or "multiplier." The multipliers in the cases discussed in this Article
range from 4.48329 to 15.2.330 Again, this is not to suggest that apprais-
ers may arbitrarily choose a multiplier; their choice of a multiplier is
based upon the multipliers of comparable companies.33' There is con-
siderable discretion available, however, in selecting "comparable" com-
panies.3 32 In addition, results will vary depending upon whether the
most recent year's earnings are used or whether earnings over a number
of years are averaged or weighted. 333
Earnings, likewise, is a soft concept. Whether items are expensed or
capitalized and what useful life is used for depreciation, as well as the
326 167 Ill. App. 3d 449, 521 N.E.2d 236 (1988).
327 See, e.g., 377 Mass. at 725, 387 N.E.2d at 1149; Bell v. Kirby Lumber, Corp., 413 A.2d 137,
146 (Del. 1980).
328 See, e.g., 377 Mass. at 726, 387 N.E.2d at 1149 (only 4,372 shares were traded in 1972, less
than one round lot per week). See also In re Glosser Bros., Inc., 382 Pa. Super. 177, 555 A.2d 129
(1989) (court recognized that a thin trading market reduced the reliability of market value but did
not necessarily warrant assigning it no weight).
329 Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1329 (D.S.C. 1987).
330 413 A.2d at 147.
331 See, e.g., 377 Mass. at 727, 387 N.E.2d at 1150.
332 Moreover, the multipliers from the comparable companies will vary over time. For example,
in April 1987, the Standard & Poor's index of 500 companies was 19 times earnings, whereas in April
1989, it was 12 times earnings. See Sease, The Market s Fine; the Street Isn't, Wall St.J., Apr. 28, 1989,
at 1, col. 3. Were companies overvalued in 1987 or undervalued in 1989 or is our economy one-
third worse off today than two years ago. Similarly, whether a company was evaluated before or after
the market break of October 19, 1987, could make a major difference.
333 See S. PRATr, supra note 312, at 56-60.
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method of depreciation, all affect earnings. The most important poten-
tial adjustment in this area is the compensation and other withdrawals for
the benefit of owner-employees. This subject will be addressed in the
next section.
Even net asset value is not a "hard"'-concept. Book value, based as it
is upon historical cost, necessarily bears no relation to the current value
of assets. Generally, land and buildings have appreciated, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the buildings have been depreciated for balance sheet
and income statement purposes. This necessitates an appraisal of
noncurrent items, which again submits the valuation to the vicissitudes of
the appraisal process. In addition, more sophisticated issues can arise.
In Piemonte, for example, it .was necessary to value the Boston Bruins
hockey franchise, as well as the value of the concessions.33 4 Clearly valu-
ation is an inexact science.
B. Adjustments Related to Oppressive Conduct
The prototypic pattern for oppressive conduct is for those in control
to fire the minority shareholder and to arrogate the earnings of the busi-
ness to themselves in the form of compensation, leaving little or no in-
come available to the minority in the form of dividends. In such a
situation, the terminated shareholder has a two-fold goal: she wants out,
but she wants out at a price which reflects the value of the business based
upon earnings as they ought to have been, had the remaining share-
holder(s) not taken excessive compensation. In effect, the same pattern
of activity can give rise to two causes of action: a derivative action to
recover the excess compensation or other waste of corporate assets, and
a direct action alleging oppression and seeking dissolution or a buy-out.
Recovery in the derivative action would, generally, inure to the ben-
efit of the corporation but would only indirectly benefit the minority
shareholder by increasing the asset value of the corporation and by pro-
viding a basis to adjust earnings upward by decreasing salary expense. 33 5
Some courts, however, have permitted direct recovery in a derivative ac-
tion. In Lynch v. Patterson,336 where the minority shareholder alleged that
those in control had withdrawn excessive salaries and fees from the cor-
poration, the court determined that the improper payments were
$266,000 and awarded plaintiff $79,800, stating: "Direct recovery as-
sures that Patterson will reap some benefit from his lawsuit. We refuse to
order payment into the corporate treasury in this case and risk necessitat-
ing a subsequent suit by Patterson to compel the directors to declare a
dividend or apply the funds to legitimate corporate purposes." In a simi-
334 337 Mass. at 732, 387 N.E.2d at 1152.
335 There is a collateral value in bringing a derivative suit, namely, directing additional focus
upon the wrongdoing of those in control. In Capital Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So. 2d 1038, 1039
(Miss. 1980), the court found* that the terminated shareholders' expectations were "thwarted, but
not grossly so," in part because profits increased after the plaintiff was terminated. However, the
former control shareholders had taken "large bonuses and salaries ... for questionable services"
and had charged expenditures for a yacht to the corporation. Id. A derivative suit would not only
have increased the value of the corporation by recovering these payments but also would have ex-
plained why earnings were low while he was employed.
336 701 P.2d 1126, 1130-31 (Wyo. 1985). See also the cases cited therein.
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
lar vein, minority shareholders have characterized payments to majority
shareholders as constructive dividends and thereby sought to recover a
comparable dividend from the corporation. This theory has produced
mixed results.33 7
The recoveries in a derivative suit can be substantial. In Johnson v.
Steel, Inc., 33 8 a forty-three percent shareholder sought dissolution on the
ground of misappropriation and waste of corporate assets in one count
and, in a third count, sought derivative relief for $650,000 compensation
in excess of that authorized. The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the
trial court's dismissal of both counts. If the plaintiff were to be successful
on both counts, she would receive approximately $280,000 more than
she otherwise would have received upon dissolution of the company.
Donahue v. Draper 3 3 9 involved a different twist. There the controlling
shareholder caused the corporation to be dissolved and arrogated the
business of the dissolved corporation to a corporation he solely owned.
The other shareholder received $321,000 as his share of the net tangible
assets upon dissolution but also filed suit to recover the unequal emolu-
ments. The jury found excess salaries of $71,000, excess pension pay-
ments of $239,707, and goodwill of $536,750. The plaintiff was entitled
to half of each sum. In these circumstances, where there is no disinter-
ested approval of the compensation or other payment, the burden is on
the defendant to prove the reasonableness of the payments.3 40
The problem with the derivative-suit approach is both the spectre of
deference to the business judgment of the directors, even though the
questioned transactions invariably involve conflicts of interest, and the
spectre of reference to tax analogs in determining what is reasonable
compensation or what is a reasonable accumulation of earnings justifying
nonpayment of dividends. For example, a familiar refrain when the mi-
nority charges that compensation to those in control is unreasonable is
that "the IRS has approved the salary." 341 In point of fact, when the
Internal Revenue Service audits a business, whether compensation will
be challenged as unreasonable is as much a function of the individual
337 In Alaska Plastics v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska 1980), the court stated that "[s]uch
transactions should be examined to determine whether they are in fact a distribution of dividends,
and if so the excluded shareholder must participate equally in the payments received by other share-
holders." See also Erdman v. Yolles, 62 Mich. App. 594, 233 N.W.2d 667 (1975); Cerami v. Dignazio,
283 Pa. Super. 424, 443, 424 A.2d 881, 891 (1980) ("[Playments [to defendants] had no reasonable
relationship to the meager services performed by them and were in fact simply a distribution of
profits. Accordingly, plaintiffs as shareholders were entitled to their proportionate share of such
corporate earnings."). But see Mann-Paller Found. v. Econometric Research, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 92
(D.D.C. 1986).
338 100 Nev. 181, 678 P.2d 676 (1984).
339 22 Mass. App. 30, 491 N.E.2d 260 (1986).
340 Newton v. Hornblower, 224 Kan. 506, 582 P.2d 1136 (1978).
341 See, e.g., Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1118, 1127,435 N.E.2d
712, 718 (1982) ("[T]he actual cost to the corporation was only halfofthe $54,600 salary because of
the determination by the Internal Revenue Service that the compensation was reasonable for the
allowance of a business deduction."); Miller v. Magline, Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 301, 256 N.W.2d
761, 768 (1977) ("[A]lthough not conclusive on the question of reasonableness, it is significant that
the Internal Revenue Service concluded, after three successive reviews from 1964 to 1968, that the
levels of executive compensation for the years in question were within the range of proper business
expenses.").
[Vol. 65:425
REMEDIES FOR AND VALUATION OF MINORITY SHARES
proclivities of the agent, and the trade-off among other challenged items,
as a reflection upon the reasonableness of compensation. Reasonable-
ness is a range, not a specific figure. If both the majority and minority
are being compensated within that range, then, from a tax standpoint,
the Internal Revenue Service ought not be able to challenge the compen-
sation. If the majority, however, is operating at the high end of the range
so as to preclude payments to the minority, relief ought to be
available.3 42
Courts are becoming increasingly aware of what has been obvious to
outside observers for a long time-that the shareholder in a close corpo-
ration "looks to his salary for the principal return on his capital invest-
ment, because earnings of a close corporation, as is well known, are
distributed in major part in salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits."3 43
In view of this, when valuing a company to determine the fair.value of an
oppressed shareholder's shares, "to truly reflect the'companies' earning
power, the net income is adjusted by eliminating from the corporate ex-
penses a portion of the officer-shareholders' salaries that is considered
excess compensation. 3 44. Thus, even if a derivative suit challenging ex-
cess compensation or other improper payments to those in control is not
coupled with a count for dissolution or buy-out, adjustments to income
must be made. Also, if asset value is part of the valuation process, then
adjustments to the balance sheet must also be made to reflect the rein-
statement of the improper withdrawals.3 45
This approach is an established procedure in valuation theory. For
example, one authority states:
In closely-held companies, it is common to find that compensation
and perquisites to owners and managers may be based on the personal
desires of owners and on the company's ability to pay rather than on
the value of services performed for the company. How much the earn-
ing power base should be adjusted to reflect discrepancies between
compensation paid and value of service performed depends on the
purpose of the valuation.
Owners of successful closely-held businesses tend to take out what
normally would be considered profits in the form of compensation and
discretionary expenses. This may be an effort to avoid the double tax-
ation that arises from paying a corporate income tax and then paying a
personal income tax on what is left from that paid in the form of divi-
dends. It is not uncommon to find an owner/manager of a successful
company drawing $150,000 annual compensation, even though his
342 Cf Gimpel v. Bolstein, 125 Misc. 2d 45, 56-57, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1022 (1984), where the
court, in giving the corporation the option to purchase the plaintiff's shares or commence a dividend
policy, stated that, if the latter course were chosen, "[t]o the extent that the salaries paid to majority
shareholders have been fixed so as to include amounts in lieu of dividends, the salaries must be
adjusted downward."
343 In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 71, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799, 804
(1984) (quoting F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS 21-22 (2d ed. 1971)).
344 Raskin v. Walter Karl, Inc., 129 A.D.2d 642, 643, 514 N.Y.S.2d 120, 121 (1987).
345 See, e.g., Salvador v. Connor, 87 Mich. App. 664, 671, 276 N.W.2d 458, 461 (1979), where the
court granted dissolution and awarded the plaintiff $167,897 in damages which included "accrued
wages, attorney's fees of $2,500, the plaintiff's one-third share of the defendant corporation, whose
assets were increased by the court's judgment finding the individual defendants liable to the corpo-
ration for some $64,000 in improperly diverted profits, and $50,000 in exemplary damages."
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services to the company could be replaced for $60,000 per year. The
extreme cases go much, much further.
If the owner/manager described in the previous paragraph wants
to sell his business and retire, the difference between his compensa-
tion and what it will cost to replace him will become available as a part
of pretax profits, and the earning power base should be adjusted ac-
cordingly in establishing the selling price of the business. 346
These salary adjustments can have a dramatic impact upon fair
value. In Hendley v. Lee, 3 4 7 the pretax income for the prior fiscal year was
$203,971. To this was added a two percent growth factor so as to in-
crease the income to $208,050. If the multiplier accepted by the court,
4.48, had been applied to this income, the value would have been
$932,064. Both parties agreed that the salary of $93,813 taken by inac-
tive shareholder was "nonfunctional." Accordingly, his expert added his
salary back into income and valued the business. at $1,334,072. The ac-
tive shareholder's expert treated $150,000 of the active shareholder's
$250,000 salary as nonfunctional and, though this expert utilized a lower
multiple than did the expert for the passive shareholder, he appraised
the business at $1,950,000 because of the increased adjusted earnings.
The court determined that only $75,000 of the $250,000 salary should be
deemed nonfunctional and arrived at a value of $1,688,348. These vary-
ing results are summarized below: 348
Adjusted
Pre-Tax Income Income Multiplier Value
No Adjustment 208,050 4.48 932,064
Add back $93,813 salary of
inactive SH 301,863 4.48 1,334,072
Add back $75,000 for active SH 376,863 4.48 1,668,348
Add back $150,000 for active SH 451,860 4.0 1,950,000
Thus, adjusting income for "excess" or "nonfunctional" income can
result in doubling the value of the corporation. The effect in a particular
case will be a function of the relation between income before allowance
for salaries, the salaries taken by shareholder-employees, and the salaries
at which shareholder-employees could be replaced by other persons.
Often shareholder-employees could not only be replaced at a lower com-
pensation but also with less manpower. For example, in a three-owner
corporation, it might be possible for two persons to do the work of the
three shareholders.
C. Minority and Illiquidity Discounts Are Inconsistent with "Fair Value"
Valuation theory traditionally has incorporated a discount process
when valuing interests held by minority shareholders. Such discounts
are predicated either upon the proposition that a minority interest is
worth less than a controlling interest (the "minority interest" discount)
346 See S. PRA"Ir, supra note 312, at 172-73.
347 676 F. Supp. 1317 (D.S.C. 1987).
348 Because of other minor adjustments, the value is not exactly equal to the product of the ad-
justed income and the multiplier.
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or the proposition that shares in a closely held corporation are not read-
ily marketable (the "liquidity" discount). The development of such dis-
counts has been in large part tax driven. Legislative and judicial
developments in the 1970s and 1980s, however, have reflected increased
concern that minority shareholders be treated fairly. The cumulative ef-
fect of these discounts can reduce the value of the minority shares by fifty
percent or more. Critical analysis of these discounts demonstrates that
they are inappropriate in determining the fair value of shares when the
valuation is triggered by oppressive conduct of those in control.
1. Valuation from a Tax Perspective
The process of utilizing discounts in valuation opinions is part of
what has been traditionally a conservative approach to valuation. As pre-
viously indicated,3 49 in valuations triggered by governmental imposition
of a tax based upon the value of property, a conservative approach is
essential lest the taxing process become confiscatory. The simple exam-
ple used in the introduction to this section assumed that, if the shares of
a corporation constituted the entirety of the estate and were overvalued
by a factor of two, the imposition of a tax at a rate of fifty-percent would
result in confiscation of the estate. The use of a fifty percent rate in the
illustration is realistic because, historically, estate tax rates have ranged
up to seventy-seven percent350 and the impact of such rates must of ne-
cessity impact valuation theory.
In the real world, shares may not necessarily be sold when a tax is
levied, but rather other assets may be used to provide the liquidity to pay
the tax. However, the net effect is the same. Because the shares cannot
readily be sold, the government appropriates the liquid assets of an es-
tate, potentially leaving a surviving spouse with no liquid assets and thus
with markedly reduced means of support. For example, with liquid as-
sets valued at $1 million and shares valued erroneously at $1 million but
saleable only at $500,000, the $1 million share value will lead to a $2
million estate value and .a tax of $1 million. Thus, the government will
receive the liquid assets and the surviving spouse will be left with shares
that can only be liquidated for $500,000. This is the same net effect as if
the government had confiscated the stock and levied a $500,000 tax on
the $1 million of liquid assets. On the other hand, had the corporation
been valued at $500,000, the estate value would have been $1.5 million,
the tax $750,000, and the surviving spouse would have retained the
shares plus $250,000 of liquid assets. Accordingly, in tax driven valua-
tions, discounting is essential to insure fairness to the holder of the
shares.35 1
The use of discounts-both minority and liquidity--is part of a "will-
ing seller, willing buyer" methodology which in turn defines "market
349 See supra text accompanying note 310.
350 S. SURREY, P. MCDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION-CASES &
MATERIALS 7 (1987).
351 It has the opposite effect in buy-out cases. See infra text preceding note 355.
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value."'3 52 Section 2031-1(b) of the estate tax regulations provides that
property is to be valued at its "fair market value."3553 The reason for the
focus upon fair market value and the "willing buyer, willing seller" test in
tax valuations is again that imposition of the tax mandates a cash out-
flow-with the concomitant requirement that at least some of the assets
be converted into liquid form. By way of contrast, the alternative remedy
statutes and judicially created buy-out remedies all speak of the "fair
value" of the shares, not the market value. As an English court remarked
in rejecting a discount for minority shares, if market value was that to
which the minority shareholder was entitled, there would be no need to
be in court; one could simply sell into the supposed market.8 54
Another perspective from which to view this situation is for the valu-
ation process to resolve doubts as to value against the person who forces
the sale. In the tax situation, it is the levying of a tax that mandates the
sale, not the free choice of the holder to realize the value of the shares at
a time the holder deems most propitious. In the situation in which the
minority shareholder seeks a judicial buy-out because of oppressive con-
duct, it is the conduct of those in control that forces the sale. As in the
tax situation, the disposition is not one freely chosen by the seller.
In contradistinction to the tax situation, in which the government
wins and the minority shareholder loses from a high valuation, in a state
court appraisal proceeding the controlling shareholder wins and the mi-
nority shareholder loses from a low valuation. Stated differently, in the
tax situation, the valuation determines the flow of funds from the share-
holder-the higher the valuation the greater the out-of-pocket loss. In
the corporate situation, the valuation process determines the flow of
funds to the shareholder-the higher the valuation the greater the gain.
Thus, caution must be exercised in importing theory developed in tax
cases into litigation seeking to protect the minority shareholder from the
oppressive conduct of those who will ultimately be the buyer of his or her
shares. State appraisal statutes are "designed to protect the minority
from the very considerations which result in a discounted value in the tax
cases. By statute, the minority is guaranteed the 'real' value of its
stock."3 55
2. Valuation from a State Law Perspective
Ten jurisdictions appear to have considered the validity of discounts
in valuing shares of minority holders. All but one decision is within the
last ten years.3 56 In addition, three federal courts have considered the
issue.3 57 Appellate courts in Illinois have split on whether discounts are
352 Atlantic States Constr., Inc., v. Beavers, 169 Ga. App. 584, 314 S.E.2d 245, 249 (1984).
353 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1989). The regulation provides in part that "fair market value is
the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the
relevant facts."
354 In re Bird Precision Ltd., 2 W.L.R. 158, 169 (1986).
355 See Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 1088, 133 N.W.2d 38, 44 (1965).
356 See id.
357 Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317 (D.S.C. 1987) (rejecting a discount when the valuation is
for a buy-out as an alternative to dissolution); Hernando Bank v. Huff, 609 F. Supp. 1124 (D. Miss.
(Vol. 65:425
REMEDIES FOR AND VALUATION OF MINORITY SHARES
appropriate. 358 Thus, excluding Illinois, nine jurisdictions have taken a
position on either minority discounts or liquidity discounts.
Of the eight jurisdictions considering minority discounts, six have
outright rejected such discounts,3 59 one has rejected it when the valua-
tion approach is to capitalize earnings,3 60 and the one jurisdiction per-
mitting the trial court to "consider" a minority discount has cautioned
that "other factors, such as market value, may wholly or partially account
for any relevant minority dis'count. ' 3 61 Thus, statistically, minority dis-
counts are almost uniformly viewed with disfavor by state courts. As in-
dicated above, the two jurisdictions that accepted minority discounts did
so on a limited basis. On the other hand, the federal courts accepting a
minority discount have glossed over the issue, one stating that minority
shareholders have no power 362 and the other that it was "unconvinced
that a minority share of stock should be valued as though it were a con-
trolling share of the corporation. ' 3 63
With respect to liquidity discounts, three courts have accepted
them3 64 and one jurisdiction has explicitly rejected them.365 The juris-
dictions that accept liquidity discounts do so on a premise they believe to
be self-evident: minority shares are not freely marketable. The issue of
liquidity discounts is not so simple and deserves more than the superfi-
cial treatment given to the issue by the courts in question. As the follow-
ing analysis demonstrates, neither the rationale for minority nor liquidity
discounts can withstand critical scrutiny.
1985), aft'd, 796 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying minority discount in appraisal proceeding after
merger); Perlman v. Permonite Mfg., Co., 568 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ind. 1983), aft'd, 734 F.2d 1283
(7th Cir. 1984) (applying both a minority and a liquidity discount in appraisal proceeding after
merger).
358 Independence Tube Corp. v. Levine, 179 I1. App. 3d 911, 535 N.E.2d 927 (1989) (accepting
both minority and liquidity discounts in appraisal proceeding after recapitalization); Johnston v.
Hickory Creek Nursery, Inc., 167 Il. App. 3d 449, 521 N.E.2d 236 (1988) (rejecting discount where
minority shares are acquired by remaining shareholders).
359 Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477, 154 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1979); Cavalier
Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Nos. 7959, 7960, 7967, 7968 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1988) (LEXIS, states library,
Del file), aff'd, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989); Bell v Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980);
Eyler v. Eyler, 492 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1986), vacating, 485 N.E.2d 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Wood-
ward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 133 N.W.2d 38 (1965); Dreiseszun v. FLM Indus., Inc., 577 S.W.2d
902, 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (value of plaintiff's shares must be computed "pro rata"); Blake v.
Blake Agency, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 139, 486 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1985).
360 Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 461, 474, 630 P.2d 167, 177 (1981). A capital-
ized earnings approach utilizes multipliers derived from quoted market prices.
361 Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 169 Ga. App. 584, 589, 314 S.E.2d 245, 251 (1984).
362 Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222, 226 (N.D. Ind. 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 128
(7th Cir. 1984).
363 Hernando Bank v. Huff, 609 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (D. Miss. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.
1986).
364 Id.; Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Ky. 1982); Raskin v.
Walter Karl, Inc., 129 A.D.2d 642, 514 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1987); In re Joy Wholesale Sundries, Inc., 125
A.D.2d 310, 508 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1986). Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 139, 149, 486
N.Y.S.2d 341, 349 (App. Div. 1985); Fleischer v. Gift Pax, Inc., 123 Misc. 2d 830, 834-35, 475
N.Y.S.2d 324, 328 (Sup. Ct. 1984), aff'd, 107 A.D.2d 97, 486 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1985).
365 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Nos. 7959, 7960, 7967, 7968 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1988) (LEXIS,
states library, Del file), aff'd, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
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3. The Theoretical and Empirical Bases to Reject Both Minority and
Liquidity Discounts.
There are several bases to reject discounts in determining the fair
value of minority shares in buy-out situations. First, it should be noted
that most cases that have considered the minority discount issue have
done so in the context of appraisal proceedings triggered generally by a
merger. None of the three cases that considered discounts in the context
of a buy-out of a shareholder by the corporation or another shareholder
imposed a minority discount.s 66 Only New York accepted a discount for
liquidity. While a distinction could be drawn between "fair value" in an
appraisal proceeding for a shareholder dissenting to a merger and "fair
value" in a buy-out proceeding predicated upon oppressive conduct,
such is not necessary. Many of the bases for rejecting discounts are ap-
plicable in either proceeding, particularly where appraisal rights are trig-
gered by a cash-out merger designed to "squeeze-out" a minority
shareholder.
What courts recognizing discounts in mergers and related type
transactions fail to appreciate is that a cash-out merger is a form of pri-
vate eminent domain. Before the enactment of liberalized statutes, a
unanimous vote of the shareholders was necessary for a merger or a sale
of substantially all the assets of a corporation. When the legislature re-
duced the vote for mergers to two-thirds or majority, it also gave dissent-
ers appraisal rights. The Iowa Supreme Court, in rejecting the use of
discounts in valuing minority shares in an appraisal proceeding, stated:
The increase in the number of corporations and stock-holders made
such a rule [unanimity] impracticable. The statute was enacted to per-
mit a majority to vote to renew the corporate life and at the same time
allow a dissenting minority to get out of the corporation with the 'real
value' of its stock. It prevented the minority from being squeezed out
for a lesser price.36 7
While the arguments against minority interests, on the one hand, and
liquidity discounts, on the other, somewhat overlap, at the risk of being
arbitrary the arguments can be allocated as follows.
Arguing, in fact mandating, rejection of the minority discount are
the empirical data attending the premiums paid in takeover activity (thus
demonstrating that the stock market values minority interests), the pro-
rata nature of the valuation process in these circumstances (particularly
where the buy-out is an alternative to liquidation), and the statutory lan-
guage itself. Arguing against the liquidity discount are: (1) the explo-
sion of available remedies in the past decade or so for minority
shareholders which either provide a market for the minority's shares or
give the minority shareholder the leverage to negotiate a better deal; (2)
the fact that either the corporation or those in control are buying (and
thus will not hold a minority position); and, (3) the inherent right of a
366 Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317 (D.S.C. 1987); Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 91
Cal. App. 3d 477, 154 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1979); Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 139, 486
N.Y.S.2d 341 (1985).
367 Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 1086, 133 N.W.2d 38, 43 (1965).
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minority shareholder to await a propitious time to sell rather than being
forced out by the oppressive conduct. These are discussed below.
a. The "Market" Reflects Minority Value
Takeover activity, particularly during the past five years, has clearly
demonstrated that the values reflected in the reported markets are those
representing the value of a minority interest. Conversely, the prices paid
in takeovers reflect a premium for the acquisition of a control position.
Were this not the case, acquirers would be derelict in the obligation they
owe to their own shareholders by overpaying for the acquired assets.
This position is now recognized both in valuation theory and by the
courts.
As previously discussed, state courts generally reject minority dis-
counts.3 68 Even a decision that has upheld the imposition of a minority
discount has recognized that such a discount is not appropriate if the
valuation technique has used market value to arrive at a valuation. In
Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., the appraiser acknowledged that "quoted mar-
ket prices ... already reflect the minority interest. '3 69 Thus, valuation
techniques that use market prices, either directly or indirectly by refer-
ence to P/E ratios or capitalization rates, should not employ a discount in
the valuation process or else the minority interest will be doubly dis-
counted. The court in Moore did uphold a minority discount with respect
to asset values, a questionable decision in light of other matters dis-
cussed below.
b. The "Pro Rata" Nature of the Triggering Event
In the context of this Article, the events that trigger the need for a
valuation are either an "organic" change that squeezes out a minority
shareholder, such as a cash-out merger, thereby giving rise to dissenters'
rights, or a suit for liquidation, generally predicated upon the oppressive
conduct of those in control, followed by a request for alternative relief in
the form of a judicially supervised buy-out. Both of these types of trig-
gering events contemplate pro rata or nondiscriminatory distributions or
payments of value. In a merger, for example, all holders of the same
class of shares receive equal treatment, on a per-share basis, irrespective
of whether one holder has fifty-one percent of the shares and another
holder has one percent of the shares. Holders of larger aggregations of
shares do not receive a higher price per share than do holders of a lesser
number of shares.
Similarly, with respect to distributions pursuant to dissolution stat-
utes, the essence of shares of the same class is that each share is entitled
to a pro rata portion of that class's claim on the corporation's assets. In
Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., the court observed:
Had plaintiffs been permitted to prove their case and had the corpora-
tion then been dissolved, it is clear that upon distribution of the disso-
368 See supra notes 359-61 and accompanying text.
369 6 Kan. App. 2d 461, 474, 630 P.2d 167, 177 (1981).
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lution proceeds each of the shareholders would have been entitled to
the exact same amount per share, with no consideration being given to
whether the share had been controlling or noncontrolling.3 70
The court noted that "since the jurisdiction of the court in an involuntary
dissolution action includes determination of how the assets will be dis-
tributed, the minority shareholder is substantially protected from inequi-
table distribution at the hands of the majority."3 7 1 Since the basic
schemes are pro rata in nature, discounting a minority interest would
upset the even-handedness inherent in the basic statutory schemes.3 72
c. The Statutory Language- "Fair Price'"
Statutes establishing dissenters' rights and alternative remedies such
as judicial buy-outs uniformly refer to "fair" price as opposed to "fair
market" price. The rationale underlying this language is the recognition
that the events that trigger the valuation process may either disrupt or
preclude the market for the shares, if in fact such a market ever existed-
as in the case of a closely held corporation. As previously discussed,3 73
the difference in language-fair value as opposed to fair market value-is
in part what makes precedent from tax cases inapplicable. Courts gener-
ally have noted that these statutory provisions have been enacted for the
benefit of minority shareholders3 74 and that minority shareholders ought
not to be punished in the valuation process. 3 75
d. Minority Shareholders Are No Longer Locked in Without a Market
The thrust of most of this Article has been to demonstrate that mi-
nority shareholders are no longer helpless in the face of majority miscon-
duct. The specter of being "locked-in" but frozen out is being relegated
to history. The development of the concept of fiduciary duties running
from those in control to minority shareholders, the restatement of op-
pression in terms of the reasonable expectations of minority sharehold-
370 91 Cal. App. 3d 447, 486, 154 Cal. Rptr. 170, 176 (1979). See also Dreiseszun v. FLM Indus.,
577 S.W.2d 902, 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
371 91 Cal. App. 3d at 486 n.7, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 176 n.7 (quoting Comment, Dissolution Under the
California Corporation Code: A Remedy for Minority Shareholders, 22 UCLA L. REv. 595, 609 (1975)).
372 See In re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd., 1984 Ch. 419, 430, aff'd, 2 W.L.R. 158 (1986).
373 See supra notes 352-54 and accompanying text.
374 Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 1086, 133 N.W.2d 38, 43, modified on reh'g, 257 Iowa
1077, 136 N.W.2d 280 (1965) (quoting Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535
(1941)) (substituting majority rule for unanimity "opened the door to victimization of the minority.
To solve the dilemma, statutes permitting a dissenting minority to recover the appraised value of its
shares were widely adopted."); Dreiseszun, 577 S.W.2d at 906 ("[T]he court below... would place a
different 'fair value' . . . depending upon whether the shares were held by a majority or minority
stockholder.... The statute does not.., intend that a minority stockholder be in any way penalized
for resorting to the remedy afforded thereunder."); Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 139,
149, 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 349 (1985) ("Business Corporation Law § 1104-a was enacted for the pro-
tection of minority shareholders, and the corporation should therefore not receive a windfall in the
form of a discount because it elected to purchase the minority interest pursuant to Business Corpo-
ration Law § 1118.").
375 Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477, 486, 154 Cal. Rptr. 170, 176
(1979) (If minority shares could be discounted, "the very misconduct which provoked the minority
shareholders to seek involuntary dissolution could, in this manner, be further used to oppress them.
This, the statutory scheme before us cannot be read as condoning.").
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ers, and the development of a buy-out remedy converge into a vastly
changed posture for minority shareholders. In New York, the court, in
Rosen v. Pace Photographers, Ltd., summarized the development as follows:
Prior to 1979, minority shareholders in close corporations who suf-
fered abuse at the hands of the majority lacked the options available to
business partners and shareholders in public corporations to extricate
the value of their investments. To preserve and protect the interest of
minority shareholders in such situations, the Legislature in 1979 pro-
vided a mechanism-a petition for dissolution-by which holders of at
least 20% of the outstanding shares of a corporation whose stock is
not traded on a securities market could salvage the value of their
investments.3 76
It is paradoxical that New York, which has been in the forefront in
protecting minority rights-legislatively through the buy-out remedy and
judicially through the reasonable expectations test-is one of the three
states that recognizes a liquidity discount. In the decision that intro-
duced the minority discount into the buy-out process, Fleischer v. Gift Pax,
InC., 3 7 7 the referee had declined to apply a liquidity discount because the
defendants, by electing to purchase the shares of the plaintiff, had be-
come willing and available buyers. The court, however, took a very nar-
row view of the policy behind the statute and focused upon the fact that
the valuation date was the day prior to filing the petition and was to be
"exclusive of any element of value arising from such filing."378 Accord-
ing to the court, this legislative language forbad the valuator to consider
that there now was a market for the shares. The court distinguished the
California decisions, which have rejected discounts, on the basis of the
differing statutory language. Since other states either do not have the
same language as New York or have judicially created buy-out remedies,
the Gift Pax result should be limited to New York.379 It is illogical to
ignore the existence of a market in applying a discount predicated upon
the lack of a market. This incongruity may be why two later decisions380
limited the liquidity discount to ten percent whereas Gift Pax imposed a
twenty-five percent discount.
The New York Court of Appeals has not yet considered this issue
but its decision in Pace Photographers, 381 in which it held that the price
provisions in a shareholders' agreement covering voluntary sales did not
dictate the "fair value" of the minority shares, calls into question the Gift
Pax rationale. In Pace Photographers, the shareholder agreement was in
effect the day prior to filing the petition and no election to buy had been
made; in Gift Pax, the minority had no assurance of a buy-out the day
prior to filing. But if the court of appeals can lbok to post-filing activity
376 71 N.Y.2d 737, 744, 525 N.E.2d 713, 716, 530 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70 (1988).
377 123 Misc. 2d 830, 475 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sup. Ct. 1984), aft'd, 107 A.D.2d 97, 486 N.Y.S.2d 272
(1985).
378 Id. at 834, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
379 The decisions in Georgia and Kentucky which approved liquidity discounts arose in appraisal
proceedings triggered by mergers.
380 Raskin v. Walter Karl, Inc., 129 A.D.2d 642, 514 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1987); In re Joy Wholesale
Sundries, Inc., 125 A.D.2d 310, 508 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1986).
381 71 N.Y.2d 737, 525 N.E.2d 713, 530 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1988).
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to negate the dictates of a shareholders' agreement, then the New York
courts ought to look to post-filing activity, namely the now existent mar-
ket, and decline to impose a liquidity discount.
In point of fact, it is not even necessary to look to post-filing activity
to reject the Gift Pax rationale. While the actual election to buy, or a
court order mandating a buy-out, cannot occur until after suit is filed, the
legislation-or in some states, judicial decisions-creating this new mar-
ket is already existent. Once a buy-out remedy as an alternative to disso-
lution is in place, the position of the minority shareholder with regard to
liquidity has changed dramatically. The Gift Pax court simply failed to
recognize this reality.
Clearly legislatures and courts have provided liquidity where hereto-
fore it either did not exist or existed on a more limited basis. If courts
are to consider all relevant factors, as courts that apply liquidity dis-
counts have opined, one very relevant factor is the existence of legisla-
tively and judicially created exits from the corporation. It would be
incongruous to discount the shares of a minority shareholder for lack of
liquidity when the valuation is being done in connection with a proceed-
ing that creates liquidity.
e. Significance of the Purchaser
In both dissenters' rights proceedings and those involving a judicial
buy-out, the purchaser of the minority shares is either the corporation or
those in control. Accordingly, the purchaser of the minority sharehold-
ers' interest does not thereafter hold a minority interest. 382
This fact impacts both the minority discount and liquidity discount
issues. One of the rationales for both these discounts is that the pur-
chaser would pay less because he or she would not be able to exercise
any control over the investment after the purchase. This obviously is not
true if the purchaser is the majority shareholder. But also, if the pur-
chaser is a corporation, the effect of the purchase is to increase the con-
trol which a majority shareholder already has. For example, if
shareholdings were split on a 60:20:20 ratio and the corporation
purchased one 20% holding, the 60% shareholder would then hold 75%
and he alone could provide the two-thirds approval necessary for some
corporate action in some states.3 83
The identity of the purchaser particularly impacts the liquidity issue.
Only actions by those in control can trigger the events that give rise to
the need for valuation. A cash-out merger can only be initiated and ap-
proved by those in control, thereby giving rise to dissenters' rights. Al-
ternative remedies, such as judicial buy-outs, are generally triggered by
oppressive conduct; normally, it is the majority that oppresses the minor-
ity, not the converse. Accordingly, it is the voluntary act of those in con-
382 See Diligenti v. R.W.M.D. Operations Kelowna Ltd., 4 B.C.L.R. 134, 165-66 (1977).
383 See, e.g.,Johnston v. Hickory Creek Nursery, Inc., 167 Ill. App. 3d 449, 455, 521 N.E.2d 236,
239-40 (1988) ("discounting does not apply in the instant case when a minority interest is being
assumed by the remaining shareholders resulting in a substantial pro rata increase in their share and
control of the corporation" (emphasis added)).
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trol that both (i) creates the need for a valuation and also (ii) provides
liquidity by triggering statutory provisions that, in effect, provide a mar-
ket for the minority's shares.
The incongruity of discounting the minority share when the pur-
chaser is the "oppressor" or the corporation controlled by the oppressor
was analyzed by the Brown court. Part of the theory of the liquidity dis-
count is that the market will pay less because the buyer is at the suffer-
ance of the majority. However, "if... the controlling shareholder has
been using his position to insure that no benefits, such as dividends or
employment, ever accrue to the owners of the minority shares, then an
argument could be made that the value of the minority shares should be
reduced even further, perhaps to zero."3 84 Thus, the greater the miscon-
duct by the majority, the less they need to pay for the minority's shares.
Surely, this cannot be what the legislatures and courts had in mind when
they created a buy-out remedy at "fair value." Rather, public policy ar-
gues against a discounting process in order that there be a disincentive to
acting in an oppressive fashion. If oppressive conduct is deterred, resort
to the courts will be avoided.
f. Abrogation of the Right to Decide When to Sell
Closely related to the previous argument is the fact that the acts of
those in control, by squeezing-out or freezing-out the minority share-
holders, have abrogated the right of such minority shareholders to con-
tinue to hold such shares and to await a more favorable sale opportunity.
Since the majority has determined when the minority must sell, the ma-
jority should not be further rewarded by acquiring such shares at a
discount.
In In Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd., the court recognized that the sale
by a wronged minority pursuant to buy-out provisions as an alternative
to dissolution is a "forced sale" because those in control have "made it
no longer tolerable for him to retain his interest in the company."3 85
Accordingly, the court concluded that "it would not merely not be fair,
but most unfair, that he should be bought out on the fictional basis appli-
cable to a free election to sell his shares.., or indeed on any other basis
which involved a discounted price."'38 6
Were the minority shareholder not being squeezed-out or frozen-
out, he or she would have the right to continue to enjoy the perquisites
of employment, which as previously discussed are most valuable,38 7 or to
await a more beneficial price from a third party. While the counter argu-
ment is that this alternative-sale possibility may never eventuate, there
are numerous cases where the majority has acquired the minority's
shares, through one technique or another, shortly before events oc-
384 Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477, 487, 154 Cal. Rptr. 170, 176
(1979).
385 In re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd., Ch. 419, 430 (1984), af'd, 2 W.L.R. 158 (1986).
386 Id.
387 See supra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
curred that substantially enhanced the value of the corporation's
shares.a 88
The action of those in control, by setting in motion events which
lead to the buy-out of the minority (thereby providing liquidity), fore-
closes the minority from participating in any future growth or future ad-
vantageous sale. Having lost the ability to alienate these shares more
advantageously, it would again be paradoxical to discount minority
shares for lack of alienability when the majority, through triggering a
buy-out have created a market now but foreclosed the possibility of a
more attractive market later.
VII. Conclusion
In the last thirty years, enormous strides have been made in realisti-
cally appraising the relationships between those in control of closely held
corporations and minority shareholders. When the business was incor-
porated, the goal of all the shareholders was participation, not control.
Because of unforeseen circumstances, one shareholder can become the
odd person out. It is only at this point that control becomes important
because it enables the new majority to exclude the unpopular share-
holder from participation in the corporation's affairs and profits. Given
that control is not an important issue when the business is incorporated,
it is incongruous to make it a critical factor in valuation when one mem-
ber is forced out.
Undue deference to business judgment has been scaled back in or-
der that action by those in control can be critically evaluated to deter-
mine whether such actions are truly business judgments or a ploy to
benefit the majority at the expense of the minority. With the recognition
that the majority bears fiduciary duties to the minority, remedies now
exist to enjoin unfair treatment of minority interests. But, most impor-
tantly, vehicles now exist to enable the minority to exit the corporation
on fair terms. The concept of oppression has been expansively defined.
While the rhetoric that "dissolution is a drastic remedy" still is to be
found, empirical data demonstrates that, if a business is sound, death of
the juristic entity has no impact upon continuation of the business enter-
prise. In another context, leveraged buy-outs have demonstrated that
there are many ways to fund the purchase of viable businesses.
Both courts and legislatures have responded to the concern about
dissolution by developing alternative remedies, particularly buy-outs of
the minority shareholders. With a less drastic remedy in place, less dras-
tic conduct has been found to be oppressive. This has culminated in the
development of the reasonable expectations test to determine if the ac-
tions of those in control have oppressed the minority.
Exiting the corporation, however, is a realistic remedy only if the
price is fair. In developing the reasonable expectations test, courts have
recognized that the owners of closely held businesses receive profits
through salary and other forms of compensation. This recognition has
388 Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985); Kardon v. National Gypsum Go., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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led courts to see more clearly the need to adjust income and assets for
nonfunctional compensation in valuing the shares of the minority for
buy-out purposes. Of critical concern in the buy-out area is the need to
reject minority and liquidity discounts that can have a dramatic and dev-
astating impact on the value of minority interests. In this area, courts
have generally rejected minority discounts. But it is incongruous to ap-
ply a liquidity discount in a proceeding in which legislatures or courts
have created liquidity. And it is incomprehensible that wrongful conduct
that drives the minority out of the corporation can doubly advantage
those in control by driving down the value of minority shares. Develop-
ments in the past thirty years have proceeded geometrically, not linearly.
If the present trend continues, the view of minority shareholders as a
"locked-in frozen-out" constituency will be a historical anomaly.
